Small Tribes, Big Gains: The Strategic Uses of Gender Quotas in the Middle East
Why do some political actors nominate women more than others in the Muslim world? This article argues that certain social groups have an instrumental demand for female candidates because they believe such candidates will enhance their electoral chances in the wake of gender quotas' adoption. Lo...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Comparative politics 2017-01, Vol.49 (2), p.1-1 |
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description | Why do some political actors nominate women more than others in the Muslim world? This article argues that certain social groups have an instrumental demand for female candidates because they believe such candidates will enhance their electoral chances in the wake of gender quotas' adoption. Looking at Jordan, it hypothesizes that small tribes can make big gains by nominating women due to the design of the country's reserved seat quota. This argument complements existing perspectives on women's (under-)representation in the Muslim world, which emphasize the role of features of the culture, economy, or religion. The analysis of original data on Jordan's local elections and tribes supports the argument. The article's findings have implications for our understanding of women's representation, tribal politics, and authoritarian elections. [web URL: http://jcp.gc.cuny.edu/2016/12/04/volume-49-number-2-january-2017/] |
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source | IngentaConnect; Jstor Complete Legacy; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts |
subjects | Authoritarianism (Political ideology) Candidates Elections Females Islamic countries Islamic culture Middle East Muslims Nomination Political campaigns Political representation Primaries & caucuses Quotas Religion & politics Representation Social groups Tribes and tribal systems Women's studies Womens studies |
title | Small Tribes, Big Gains: The Strategic Uses of Gender Quotas in the Middle East |
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