Can welfare abuse be welfare improving?

I analyze quantitatively a model of labor search with unemployment insurance (UI), savings, voluntary quits and various labor attachment requirements. In particular, I study welfare consequences of a powerful reform giving UI entitlement to workers quitting their jobs voluntarily in order to search...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of public economics 2016-09, Vol.141, p.11-28
1. Verfasser:	Mazur, Karol
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Inequality Labor market Labor search Matching concept Savings Search behavior Search strategies Unemployment insurance Voluntary quits Welfare economics Welfare fraud
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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