Stable vessel-cargo matching in dry bulk shipping market with price game mechanism
•A stable vessel-cargo matching model is proposed.•A price game mechanism is designed for the disadvantaged participants.•The matching equilibrium and price equilibrium are formulated.•Three scenarios are discussed in the whole shipping cycle. This paper proposes a model of stable vessel-cargo match...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Transportation research. Part E, Logistics and transportation review Logistics and transportation review, 2016-11, Vol.95, p.76-94 |
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| container_title | Transportation research. Part E, Logistics and transportation review |
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| creator | Peng, Zixuan Shan, Wenxuan Guan, Feng Yu, Bin |
| description | •A stable vessel-cargo matching model is proposed.•A price game mechanism is designed for the disadvantaged participants.•The matching equilibrium and price equilibrium are formulated.•Three scenarios are discussed in the whole shipping cycle.
This paper proposes a model of stable vessel-cargo matching with price game mechanism in the dry bulk shipping market. The research aims at mimicking the bid of disadvantaged participants in the process of matching preferred objects. The matching equilibrium and price equilibrium are formulated between the shippers and carriers. A price game mechanism based Gale-Shapley algorithm is developed. Three scenarios of market dominated by shippers, market dominated by carriers, and equilibrium market are discussed in computational experiments. It is showed that if disadvantaged participants bid with the price game mechanism, they may gain more surpluses even in the negative position. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.tre.2016.08.007 |
| format | Article |
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This paper proposes a model of stable vessel-cargo matching with price game mechanism in the dry bulk shipping market. The research aims at mimicking the bid of disadvantaged participants in the process of matching preferred objects. The matching equilibrium and price equilibrium are formulated between the shippers and carriers. A price game mechanism based Gale-Shapley algorithm is developed. Three scenarios of market dominated by shippers, market dominated by carriers, and equilibrium market are discussed in computational experiments. It is showed that if disadvantaged participants bid with the price game mechanism, they may gain more surpluses even in the negative position.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1366-5545</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1878-5794</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2016.08.007</identifier><identifier>CODEN: TRERFW</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Exeter: Elsevier India Pvt Ltd</publisher><subject>Algorithms ; Carrier ; Carriers ; Decision making models ; Drying ; Equilibrium ; Game theory ; Games ; Markets ; Matching ; Motor carriers ; Price game ; Pricing ; Shipper ; Shipping ; Shipping industry ; Stable matching ; Studies ; Transportation</subject><ispartof>Transportation research. Part E, Logistics and transportation review, 2016-11, Vol.95, p.76-94</ispartof><rights>2016 Elsevier Ltd</rights><rights>Copyright Elsevier Sequoia S.A. Nov 2016</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c439t-82768e974d83c76ea6422ca03abd632cc6b656b614d7480d370a79c6ef4fbb883</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c439t-82768e974d83c76ea6422ca03abd632cc6b656b614d7480d370a79c6ef4fbb883</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2016.08.007$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,3550,27924,27925,45995</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Peng, Zixuan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Shan, Wenxuan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Guan, Feng</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Yu, Bin</creatorcontrib><title>Stable vessel-cargo matching in dry bulk shipping market with price game mechanism</title><title>Transportation research. Part E, Logistics and transportation review</title><description>•A stable vessel-cargo matching model is proposed.•A price game mechanism is designed for the disadvantaged participants.•The matching equilibrium and price equilibrium are formulated.•Three scenarios are discussed in the whole shipping cycle.
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| ispartof | Transportation research. Part E, Logistics and transportation review, 2016-11, Vol.95, p.76-94 |
| issn | 1366-5545 1878-5794 |
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| source | ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present) |
| subjects | Algorithms Carrier Carriers Decision making models Drying Equilibrium Game theory Games Markets Matching Motor carriers Price game Pricing Shipper Shipping Shipping industry Stable matching Studies Transportation |
| title | Stable vessel-cargo matching in dry bulk shipping market with price game mechanism |
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