Optimal Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions and Combinatorial Public Projects via Convex Rounding

We design the first truthful-in-expectation, constant-factor approximation mechanisms for NP -hard cases of the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions with nonidentical items and in combinatorial public projects. Our results apply to bidders with valuations that are nonnegative linea...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of the ACM 2016-11, Vol.63 (4), p.1-33
Hauptverfasser:	Dughmi, Shaddin, Roughgarden, Tim, Yan, Qiqi
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Algorithms Approximation Auctions Bidders Combinatorial analysis Convex analysis Functions (mathematics) Mathematical analysis Optimization Rounding Studies Valuation
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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