A Game of Two Elderly Care Facilities: Competition, Mothballing Options, and Policy Implications
This article develops a model to investigate the entry strategies of private investors to the elderly care service market, with the purpose of explaining the reasons behind dilemma of low signing rate plaguing China’s Public-Private Partnership projects. We focus on the competition between two priva...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Mathematical problems in engineering 2016-01, Vol.2016 (2016), p.1-12 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 12 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 2016 |
| container_start_page | 1 |
| container_title | Mathematical problems in engineering |
| container_volume | 2016 |
| creator | Wang, Congcong Chen, Rongda Zhao, Yingxue |
| description | This article develops a model to investigate the entry strategies of private investors to the elderly care service market, with the purpose of explaining the reasons behind dilemma of low signing rate plaguing China’s Public-Private Partnership projects. We focus on the competition between two private investors with or without mothballing options under price uncertainty. After the derivation of equilibria of entry strategies, we employ numerical examples to analyze the dependencies of entry thresholds on market parameters, cost parameters, subsidy, and possession of mothballing option. Conclusions are drawn and some policy implications are given with the intention to alleviate the problem of low signing rate. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1155/2016/3241973 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1845800374</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>1845800374</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c350t-809a5b11f239675d537801a57dff113a33546324ae5488b409e160a3121d79813</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqF0M9LwzAUB_AgCs7pzbMEvAiuLi8_-sPbKNscKPMwwVvN2tRlpE1tOsb-ezM3ELx4ei_Jh_DeF6FrIA8AQgwpgXDIKIckYieoByJkgQAenfqeUB4AZe_n6MK5NSEUBMQ99DHCU1kpbEu82Fo8NoVqzQ6nslV4InNtdKeVe8SprRrV-YOtB_jFdqulNEbXn3je7O_cAMu6wK_W6HyHZ1Xjq_x5uERnpTROXR1rH71Nxov0KXieT2fp6DnImSBdEJNEiiVASVkSRqIQLIoJSBEVZQnAJGOCh341qQSP4yUniYKQSAYUiiiJgfXR3eHfprVfG-W6rNIuV8bIWtmNyyDmIiaERdzT2z90bTdt7afzipKQ8sQn10eDg8pb61yryqxpdSXbXQYk28ed7ePOjnF7fn_gK10Xcqv_0zcHrbxRpfzVAJSQkH0DTCqFpA</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1820624956</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>A Game of Two Elderly Care Facilities: Competition, Mothballing Options, and Policy Implications</title><source>Wiley Online Library Open Access</source><source>EZB-FREE-00999 freely available EZB journals</source><source>Alma/SFX Local Collection</source><creator>Wang, Congcong ; Chen, Rongda ; Zhao, Yingxue</creator><contributor>Lin, Xiaodong</contributor><creatorcontrib>Wang, Congcong ; Chen, Rongda ; Zhao, Yingxue ; Lin, Xiaodong</creatorcontrib><description>This article develops a model to investigate the entry strategies of private investors to the elderly care service market, with the purpose of explaining the reasons behind dilemma of low signing rate plaguing China’s Public-Private Partnership projects. We focus on the competition between two private investors with or without mothballing options under price uncertainty. After the derivation of equilibria of entry strategies, we employ numerical examples to analyze the dependencies of entry thresholds on market parameters, cost parameters, subsidy, and possession of mothballing option. Conclusions are drawn and some policy implications are given with the intention to alleviate the problem of low signing rate.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1024-123X</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1563-5147</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1155/2016/3241973</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Cairo, Egypt: Hindawi Publishing Corporation</publisher><subject>Aging ; Colleges & universities ; Competition ; Cost analysis ; Economic models ; Elder care ; Elderly people ; Growth rate ; Infrastructure ; Investment ; Market entry ; Markets ; Mathematical models ; Older people ; Parameter uncertainty ; Parameters ; Policies ; Population ; Real options analysis ; Strategy ; Subsidies ; Volatility</subject><ispartof>Mathematical problems in engineering, 2016-01, Vol.2016 (2016), p.1-12</ispartof><rights>Copyright © 2016 Congcong Wang et al.</rights><rights>Copyright © 2016 Congcong Wang et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c350t-809a5b11f239675d537801a57dff113a33546324ae5488b409e160a3121d79813</cites><orcidid>0000-0002-9713-0981 ; 0000-0001-8526-6729 ; 0000-0001-7245-3074</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,777,781,27905,27906</link.rule.ids></links><search><contributor>Lin, Xiaodong</contributor><creatorcontrib>Wang, Congcong</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Chen, Rongda</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Zhao, Yingxue</creatorcontrib><title>A Game of Two Elderly Care Facilities: Competition, Mothballing Options, and Policy Implications</title><title>Mathematical problems in engineering</title><description>This article develops a model to investigate the entry strategies of private investors to the elderly care service market, with the purpose of explaining the reasons behind dilemma of low signing rate plaguing China’s Public-Private Partnership projects. We focus on the competition between two private investors with or without mothballing options under price uncertainty. After the derivation of equilibria of entry strategies, we employ numerical examples to analyze the dependencies of entry thresholds on market parameters, cost parameters, subsidy, and possession of mothballing option. Conclusions are drawn and some policy implications are given with the intention to alleviate the problem of low signing rate.</description><subject>Aging</subject><subject>Colleges & universities</subject><subject>Competition</subject><subject>Cost analysis</subject><subject>Economic models</subject><subject>Elder care</subject><subject>Elderly people</subject><subject>Growth rate</subject><subject>Infrastructure</subject><subject>Investment</subject><subject>Market entry</subject><subject>Markets</subject><subject>Mathematical models</subject><subject>Older people</subject><subject>Parameter uncertainty</subject><subject>Parameters</subject><subject>Policies</subject><subject>Population</subject><subject>Real options analysis</subject><subject>Strategy</subject><subject>Subsidies</subject><subject>Volatility</subject><issn>1024-123X</issn><issn>1563-5147</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2016</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>RHX</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><recordid>eNqF0M9LwzAUB_AgCs7pzbMEvAiuLi8_-sPbKNscKPMwwVvN2tRlpE1tOsb-ezM3ELx4ei_Jh_DeF6FrIA8AQgwpgXDIKIckYieoByJkgQAenfqeUB4AZe_n6MK5NSEUBMQ99DHCU1kpbEu82Fo8NoVqzQ6nslV4InNtdKeVe8SprRrV-YOtB_jFdqulNEbXn3je7O_cAMu6wK_W6HyHZ1Xjq_x5uERnpTROXR1rH71Nxov0KXieT2fp6DnImSBdEJNEiiVASVkSRqIQLIoJSBEVZQnAJGOCh341qQSP4yUniYKQSAYUiiiJgfXR3eHfprVfG-W6rNIuV8bIWtmNyyDmIiaERdzT2z90bTdt7afzipKQ8sQn10eDg8pb61yryqxpdSXbXQYk28ed7ePOjnF7fn_gK10Xcqv_0zcHrbxRpfzVAJSQkH0DTCqFpA</recordid><startdate>20160101</startdate><enddate>20160101</enddate><creator>Wang, Congcong</creator><creator>Chen, Rongda</creator><creator>Zhao, Yingxue</creator><general>Hindawi Publishing Corporation</general><general>Hindawi Limited</general><scope>ADJCN</scope><scope>AHFXO</scope><scope>RHU</scope><scope>RHW</scope><scope>RHX</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7TB</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>8FE</scope><scope>8FG</scope><scope>ABJCF</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ARAPS</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BGLVJ</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>CWDGH</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FR3</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>HCIFZ</scope><scope>JQ2</scope><scope>K7-</scope><scope>KR7</scope><scope>L6V</scope><scope>M7S</scope><scope>P5Z</scope><scope>P62</scope><scope>PIMPY</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>PTHSS</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9713-0981</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8526-6729</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7245-3074</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20160101</creationdate><title>A Game of Two Elderly Care Facilities: Competition, Mothballing Options, and Policy Implications</title><author>Wang, Congcong ; Chen, Rongda ; Zhao, Yingxue</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c350t-809a5b11f239675d537801a57dff113a33546324ae5488b409e160a3121d79813</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2016</creationdate><topic>Aging</topic><topic>Colleges & universities</topic><topic>Competition</topic><topic>Cost analysis</topic><topic>Economic models</topic><topic>Elder care</topic><topic>Elderly people</topic><topic>Growth rate</topic><topic>Infrastructure</topic><topic>Investment</topic><topic>Market entry</topic><topic>Markets</topic><topic>Mathematical models</topic><topic>Older people</topic><topic>Parameter uncertainty</topic><topic>Parameters</topic><topic>Policies</topic><topic>Population</topic><topic>Real options analysis</topic><topic>Strategy</topic><topic>Subsidies</topic><topic>Volatility</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Wang, Congcong</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Chen, Rongda</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Zhao, Yingxue</creatorcontrib><collection>الدوريات العلمية والإحصائية - e-Marefa Academic and Statistical Periodicals</collection><collection>معرفة - المحتوى العربي الأكاديمي المتكامل - e-Marefa Academic Complete</collection><collection>Hindawi Publishing Complete</collection><collection>Hindawi Publishing Subscription Journals</collection><collection>Hindawi Publishing Open Access</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Mechanical & Transportation Engineering Abstracts</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>ProQuest SciTech Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Technology Collection</collection><collection>Materials Science & Engineering Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>Advanced Technologies & Aerospace Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Technology Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>Middle East & Africa Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>Engineering Research Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>SciTech Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Computer Science Collection</collection><collection>Computer Science Database</collection><collection>Civil Engineering Abstracts</collection><collection>ProQuest Engineering Collection</collection><collection>Engineering Database</collection><collection>Advanced Technologies & Aerospace Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Advanced Technologies & Aerospace Collection</collection><collection>Publicly Available Content Database</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><collection>Engineering Collection</collection><jtitle>Mathematical problems in engineering</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Wang, Congcong</au><au>Chen, Rongda</au><au>Zhao, Yingxue</au><au>Lin, Xiaodong</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>A Game of Two Elderly Care Facilities: Competition, Mothballing Options, and Policy Implications</atitle><jtitle>Mathematical problems in engineering</jtitle><date>2016-01-01</date><risdate>2016</risdate><volume>2016</volume><issue>2016</issue><spage>1</spage><epage>12</epage><pages>1-12</pages><issn>1024-123X</issn><eissn>1563-5147</eissn><abstract>This article develops a model to investigate the entry strategies of private investors to the elderly care service market, with the purpose of explaining the reasons behind dilemma of low signing rate plaguing China’s Public-Private Partnership projects. We focus on the competition between two private investors with or without mothballing options under price uncertainty. After the derivation of equilibria of entry strategies, we employ numerical examples to analyze the dependencies of entry thresholds on market parameters, cost parameters, subsidy, and possession of mothballing option. Conclusions are drawn and some policy implications are given with the intention to alleviate the problem of low signing rate.</abstract><cop>Cairo, Egypt</cop><pub>Hindawi Publishing Corporation</pub><doi>10.1155/2016/3241973</doi><tpages>12</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9713-0981</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8526-6729</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7245-3074</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 1024-123X |
| ispartof | Mathematical problems in engineering, 2016-01, Vol.2016 (2016), p.1-12 |
| issn | 1024-123X 1563-5147 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1845800374 |
| source | Wiley Online Library Open Access; EZB-FREE-00999 freely available EZB journals; Alma/SFX Local Collection |
| subjects | Aging Colleges & universities Competition Cost analysis Economic models Elder care Elderly people Growth rate Infrastructure Investment Market entry Markets Mathematical models Older people Parameter uncertainty Parameters Policies Population Real options analysis Strategy Subsidies Volatility |
| title | A Game of Two Elderly Care Facilities: Competition, Mothballing Options, and Policy Implications |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-20T23%3A04%3A14IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=A%20Game%20of%20Two%20Elderly%20Care%20Facilities:%20Competition,%20Mothballing%20Options,%20and%20Policy%20Implications&rft.jtitle=Mathematical%20problems%20in%20engineering&rft.au=Wang,%20Congcong&rft.date=2016-01-01&rft.volume=2016&rft.issue=2016&rft.spage=1&rft.epage=12&rft.pages=1-12&rft.issn=1024-123X&rft.eissn=1563-5147&rft_id=info:doi/10.1155/2016/3241973&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E1845800374%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1820624956&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true |