Designing Cabinets: Presidential Politics and Ministerial Instability

This article proposes a set of arguments about the strategic use of cabinet appointments by executives in presidential systems. Although recent work has greatly improved our understanding of government formation in presidential countries, most changes to presidential cabinets happen throughout the l...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of politics in Latin America 2014-01, Vol.6 (2), p.3-38
1. Verfasser:	Martínez-Gallardo, Cecilia
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Appointment Cabinets Presidential Systems Presidents
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!