“Agreeing to disagree” type results under ambiguity

This paper characterizes conditions under which it is impossible for non-Bayesian agents to “agree to disagree” on their individual decisions. The agents are Choquet expected utility maximizers. Whenever each agent’s information partition is composed of unambiguous events in the sense of Nehring (19...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of mathematical economics 2015-12, Vol.61, p.119-129
Hauptverfasser:	Dominiak, Adam, Lefort, Jean-Philippe
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Agreement theorems Ambiguity Asymmetric information Bayesian analysis Bayesian method Choquet expected utility Decision making Expected utility Studies Unambiguous events Updating
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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