A global game with strategic substitutes and complements: Comment

In Karp et al. (2007), an argument is made to show existence of Bayesian–Nash equilibrium in global games that may include both strategic substitutes and complements. This note documents a gap in the proof of that statement.

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Veröffentlicht in:Games and economic behavior 2015-11, Vol.94, p.188-190
Hauptverfasser: Hoffmann, Eric J., Sabarwal, Tarun
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:In Karp et al. (2007), an argument is made to show existence of Bayesian–Nash equilibrium in global games that may include both strategic substitutes and complements. This note documents a gap in the proof of that statement.
ISSN:0899-8256
1090-2473
DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.002