Decentralization and Political Corruption: Disaggregating Regional Authority

In this article, we argue that countries with strong regional self-rule offer more incentives and opportunities to form networks of local collusion leading to higher corruption levels. In contrast, shared rule allows for more oversight on the national level which reduces political corruption. Using...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Publius 2015-01, Vol.45 (1), p.24-50
Hauptverfasser:	Neudorfer, Benjamin, Neudorfer, Natascha S.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Authority Corruption Corruption in government Decentralization Decision-making Hypothesis testing Incentives Networks Oversight Regions Regulation Rules Surveillance
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description	In this article, we argue that countries with strong regional self-rule offer more incentives and opportunities to form networks of local collusion leading to higher corruption levels. In contrast, shared rule allows for more oversight on the national level which reduces political corruption. Using a recent dataset on regional authority, we test our hypotheses on a sample of up to thirty-six countries between 1984 and 2006 and find robust empirical support for the predicted contrasting effects of regional authority: Self-rule enhances and shared rule limits political corruption.
doi_str_mv	10.1093/publius/pju035
format	Article
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source	EBSCOhost Political Science Complete; PAIS Index; Oxford Journals - Connect here FIRST to enable access; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; JSTOR
subjects	Authority Corruption Corruption in government Decentralization Decision-making Hypothesis testing Incentives Networks Oversight Regions Regulation Rules Surveillance
title	Decentralization and Political Corruption: Disaggregating Regional Authority
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