There is no such thing as a right to dignity: A rejoinder to Emily Kidd White

Emily Kidd White has written a thought-provoking response to my paper, "There is No Such Thing as a Right to Dignity," to which I have been invited to write a brief rejoinder. In the limited space available, I cannot address all her points; I will focus primarily on Whites disagreement with what she describes as my minimalist conception of human dignity, and her contention that the concept of dignity is capable of carrying multiple meanings at once. The characterization of my approach as minimalist is partially accurate, but not entirely, as I will explain. Her description of human dignity as a cluster concept carrying multiple meanings is in keeping with the approach of other commentators, and thus has much support. However, the purpose of my paper was to advocate an approach that fostered more consistency in the usage of human dignity as a constitutional principle. While the approach advocated by White may make sense from a purely philosophical standpoint, my contention is that there are sound reasons for taking a more focused approach in the sphere of constitutional law. Moreover, two of the meanings put forward by White are, in my view, contradictory and therefore mutually exclusive. Adapted from the source document.