Rooting Out Waste, Fraud, and Abuse: The Politics of House Committee Investigations, 1947 to 2004
Scholars have long bemoaned congressional disinterest in oversight. We explain varied congressional attention to oversight by advancing the contingent oversight theory. We show how the structure of congressional committees, partisan majorities, and theories of delegation together explain when, why,...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Political research quarterly 2013-09, Vol.66 (3), p.630-644 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 644 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 3 |
| container_start_page | 630 |
| container_title | Political research quarterly |
| container_volume | 66 |
| creator | Parker, David C.W. Dull, Matthew |
| description | Scholars have long bemoaned congressional disinterest in oversight. We explain varied congressional attention to oversight by advancing the contingent oversight theory. We show how the structure of congressional committees, partisan majorities, and theories of delegation together explain when, why, and for how long Congress investigated executive branch malfeasance between 1947 and 2004. Divided government, partisan committees, and committees characterized by broad statutory discretion generate more investigations, whereas distributive committees and unified government dampen Congress' investigatory vigor.The conduct of oversight depends on more than a desire to produce good government or the incentive structures faced by individual members of Congress. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1177/1065912912459566 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1735643840</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>23563170</jstor_id><sage_id>10.1177_1065912912459566</sage_id><sourcerecordid>23563170</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c383t-2b2d1f7c23eb4ef8f595ebc92ebfcebe7a3489d662601176b65a21a7c15773e43</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqNkc1Lw0AQxYMoWKt3L8KCFw-N7vcm3kqxtiBUpKK3sEkmNSXN1uxG8L93Y0SkIAoDO-z85vEeEwSnBF8SotQVwVLEhPriIhZS7gUDErMopIo_7_vej8NufhgcWbvGmFDCxSDQD8a4sl6hRevQk7YORmja6DYfIV3naJy2Fq7R8gXQvalKV2YWmQLNjP9GE7PZlM4BoHn9BtaVK-1KU9sRIjFXyBlEMebHwUGhKwsnX-8weJzeLCez8G5xO5-M78KMRcyFNKU5KVRGGaQciqjwKSDNYgppkUEKSjMexbmUVGIfWKZSaEq0yohQigFnw-Ci19025rX1dpJNaTOoKl2Dt5sQxYTkLOL4b5RLhpkQnPwD9a5iRlSner6Drk3b1D5zRwkmYkaZp3BPZY2xtoEi2TblRjfvCcFJd8lk95J-JexXrF7BD9Hf-bOeX1tnmm996vN_Gv0AqFaivg</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1445359323</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Rooting Out Waste, Fraud, and Abuse: The Politics of House Committee Investigations, 1947 to 2004</title><source>PAIS Index</source><source>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</source><source>JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing</source><source>SAGE Complete A-Z List</source><source>Political Science Complete</source><source>Alma/SFX Local Collection</source><creator>Parker, David C.W. ; Dull, Matthew</creator><creatorcontrib>Parker, David C.W. ; Dull, Matthew</creatorcontrib><description>Scholars have long bemoaned congressional disinterest in oversight. We explain varied congressional attention to oversight by advancing the contingent oversight theory. We show how the structure of congressional committees, partisan majorities, and theories of delegation together explain when, why, and for how long Congress investigated executive branch malfeasance between 1947 and 2004. Divided government, partisan committees, and committees characterized by broad statutory discretion generate more investigations, whereas distributive committees and unified government dampen Congress' investigatory vigor.The conduct of oversight depends on more than a desire to produce good government or the incentive structures faced by individual members of Congress.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1065-9129</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1938-274X</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1177/1065912912459566</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications</publisher><subject>Cartels ; Committees ; Congressional committees ; Congressional investigations ; Delegation ; Divided Government ; Executive branch ; Executive committees ; Executives ; Fire alarms ; Fraud ; Government ; Governmental investigations ; Governmental reform ; Incentives ; Investigation ; Legislative Bodies ; Legislators ; Oversight ; Parliamentary committees ; Partisanship ; Party conferences ; Political corruption ; Political parties ; Political partisanship ; Politics ; Public interest ; Studies ; Surveillance ; U.S.A</subject><ispartof>Political research quarterly, 2013-09, Vol.66 (3), p.630-644</ispartof><rights>Copyright © 2013 The University of Utah</rights><rights>2012 University of Utah</rights><rights>Copyright SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC. Sep 2013</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c383t-2b2d1f7c23eb4ef8f595ebc92ebfcebe7a3489d662601176b65a21a7c15773e43</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23563170$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/23563170$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,803,12845,21819,27865,27866,27924,27925,43621,43622,58017,58250</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Parker, David C.W.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Dull, Matthew</creatorcontrib><title>Rooting Out Waste, Fraud, and Abuse: The Politics of House Committee Investigations, 1947 to 2004</title><title>Political research quarterly</title><description>Scholars have long bemoaned congressional disinterest in oversight. We explain varied congressional attention to oversight by advancing the contingent oversight theory. We show how the structure of congressional committees, partisan majorities, and theories of delegation together explain when, why, and for how long Congress investigated executive branch malfeasance between 1947 and 2004. Divided government, partisan committees, and committees characterized by broad statutory discretion generate more investigations, whereas distributive committees and unified government dampen Congress' investigatory vigor.The conduct of oversight depends on more than a desire to produce good government or the incentive structures faced by individual members of Congress.</description><subject>Cartels</subject><subject>Committees</subject><subject>Congressional committees</subject><subject>Congressional investigations</subject><subject>Delegation</subject><subject>Divided Government</subject><subject>Executive branch</subject><subject>Executive committees</subject><subject>Executives</subject><subject>Fire alarms</subject><subject>Fraud</subject><subject>Government</subject><subject>Governmental investigations</subject><subject>Governmental reform</subject><subject>Incentives</subject><subject>Investigation</subject><subject>Legislative Bodies</subject><subject>Legislators</subject><subject>Oversight</subject><subject>Parliamentary committees</subject><subject>Partisanship</subject><subject>Party conferences</subject><subject>Political corruption</subject><subject>Political parties</subject><subject>Political partisanship</subject><subject>Politics</subject><subject>Public interest</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Surveillance</subject><subject>U.S.A</subject><issn>1065-9129</issn><issn>1938-274X</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2013</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNqNkc1Lw0AQxYMoWKt3L8KCFw-N7vcm3kqxtiBUpKK3sEkmNSXN1uxG8L93Y0SkIAoDO-z85vEeEwSnBF8SotQVwVLEhPriIhZS7gUDErMopIo_7_vej8NufhgcWbvGmFDCxSDQD8a4sl6hRevQk7YORmja6DYfIV3naJy2Fq7R8gXQvalKV2YWmQLNjP9GE7PZlM4BoHn9BtaVK-1KU9sRIjFXyBlEMebHwUGhKwsnX-8weJzeLCez8G5xO5-M78KMRcyFNKU5KVRGGaQciqjwKSDNYgppkUEKSjMexbmUVGIfWKZSaEq0yohQigFnw-Ci19025rX1dpJNaTOoKl2Dt5sQxYTkLOL4b5RLhpkQnPwD9a5iRlSner6Drk3b1D5zRwkmYkaZp3BPZY2xtoEi2TblRjfvCcFJd8lk95J-JexXrF7BD9Hf-bOeX1tnmm996vN_Gv0AqFaivg</recordid><startdate>20130901</startdate><enddate>20130901</enddate><creator>Parker, David C.W.</creator><creator>Dull, Matthew</creator><general>Sage Publications</general><general>SAGE Publications</general><general>SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>0-V</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>7UB</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>88F</scope><scope>88J</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ALSLI</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope><scope>DPSOV</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>KC-</scope><scope>M1Q</scope><scope>M2L</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>M2R</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>Q9U</scope><scope>S0X</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20130901</creationdate><title>Rooting Out Waste, Fraud, and Abuse: The Politics of House Committee Investigations, 1947 to 2004</title><author>Parker, David C.W. ; Dull, Matthew</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c383t-2b2d1f7c23eb4ef8f595ebc92ebfcebe7a3489d662601176b65a21a7c15773e43</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2013</creationdate><topic>Cartels</topic><topic>Committees</topic><topic>Congressional committees</topic><topic>Congressional investigations</topic><topic>Delegation</topic><topic>Divided Government</topic><topic>Executive branch</topic><topic>Executive committees</topic><topic>Executives</topic><topic>Fire alarms</topic><topic>Fraud</topic><topic>Government</topic><topic>Governmental investigations</topic><topic>Governmental reform</topic><topic>Incentives</topic><topic>Investigation</topic><topic>Legislative Bodies</topic><topic>Legislators</topic><topic>Oversight</topic><topic>Parliamentary committees</topic><topic>Partisanship</topic><topic>Party conferences</topic><topic>Political corruption</topic><topic>Political parties</topic><topic>Political partisanship</topic><topic>Politics</topic><topic>Public interest</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Surveillance</topic><topic>U.S.A</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Parker, David C.W.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Dull, Matthew</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>ProQuest Social Sciences Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>Military Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Social Science Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>Research Library (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>Social Science Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>eLibrary</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><collection>Politics Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>Research Library Prep</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Politics Collection</collection><collection>Military Database</collection><collection>Political Science Database</collection><collection>Research Library</collection><collection>Social Science Database</collection><collection>Research Library (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><collection>SIRS Editorial</collection><jtitle>Political research quarterly</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Parker, David C.W.</au><au>Dull, Matthew</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Rooting Out Waste, Fraud, and Abuse: The Politics of House Committee Investigations, 1947 to 2004</atitle><jtitle>Political research quarterly</jtitle><date>2013-09-01</date><risdate>2013</risdate><volume>66</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>630</spage><epage>644</epage><pages>630-644</pages><issn>1065-9129</issn><eissn>1938-274X</eissn><abstract>Scholars have long bemoaned congressional disinterest in oversight. We explain varied congressional attention to oversight by advancing the contingent oversight theory. We show how the structure of congressional committees, partisan majorities, and theories of delegation together explain when, why, and for how long Congress investigated executive branch malfeasance between 1947 and 2004. Divided government, partisan committees, and committees characterized by broad statutory discretion generate more investigations, whereas distributive committees and unified government dampen Congress' investigatory vigor.The conduct of oversight depends on more than a desire to produce good government or the incentive structures faced by individual members of Congress.</abstract><cop>Los Angeles, CA</cop><pub>Sage Publications</pub><doi>10.1177/1065912912459566</doi><tpages>15</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 1065-9129 |
| ispartof | Political research quarterly, 2013-09, Vol.66 (3), p.630-644 |
| issn | 1065-9129 1938-274X |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1735643840 |
| source | PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; SAGE Complete A-Z List; Political Science Complete; Alma/SFX Local Collection |
| subjects | Cartels Committees Congressional committees Congressional investigations Delegation Divided Government Executive branch Executive committees Executives Fire alarms Fraud Government Governmental investigations Governmental reform Incentives Investigation Legislative Bodies Legislators Oversight Parliamentary committees Partisanship Party conferences Political corruption Political parties Political partisanship Politics Public interest Studies Surveillance U.S.A |
| title | Rooting Out Waste, Fraud, and Abuse: The Politics of House Committee Investigations, 1947 to 2004 |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-05T13%3A17%3A51IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Rooting%20Out%20Waste,%20Fraud,%20and%20Abuse:%20The%20Politics%20of%20House%20Committee%20Investigations,%201947%20to%202004&rft.jtitle=Political%20research%20quarterly&rft.au=Parker,%20David%20C.W.&rft.date=2013-09-01&rft.volume=66&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=630&rft.epage=644&rft.pages=630-644&rft.issn=1065-9129&rft.eissn=1938-274X&rft_id=info:doi/10.1177/1065912912459566&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E23563170%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1445359323&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=23563170&rft_sage_id=10.1177_1065912912459566&rfr_iscdi=true |