Collusion among many firms: The disciplinary power of targeted punishment
•We introduce the possibility of targeted punishment to experimental Cournot games.•We observe markets with two to eight competitors.•Targeted punishment leads to more collusion across all markets.•Beyond two competitors, the collusive effect of targeted punishment is stronger in larger groups. We e...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economic behavior & organization 2015-08, Vol.116, p.83-93 |
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| container_title | Journal of economic behavior & organization |
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| creator | Roux, Catherine Thöni, Christian |
| description | •We introduce the possibility of targeted punishment to experimental Cournot games.•We observe markets with two to eight competitors.•Targeted punishment leads to more collusion across all markets.•Beyond two competitors, the collusive effect of targeted punishment is stronger in larger groups.
We explore targeted punishment as an explanation for collusion among many firms. We run a series of Cournot oligopoly experiments with and without the possibility of targeting punishment at specific market participants. In markets with two, four, six, and eight firms, we analyze to what extent targeted punishment helps firms to restrict output. We find that targeted punishment leads to more collusion across all markets. Furthermore, beyond two firms, this collusive effect turns out to be even stronger in markets with more competitors, suggesting a reversal of the conventional wisdom that collusion is easier with fewer firms. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.03.018 |
| format | Article |
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We explore targeted punishment as an explanation for collusion among many firms. We run a series of Cournot oligopoly experiments with and without the possibility of targeting punishment at specific market participants. In markets with two, four, six, and eight firms, we analyze to what extent targeted punishment helps firms to restrict output. We find that targeted punishment leads to more collusion across all markets. Furthermore, beyond two firms, this collusive effect turns out to be even stronger in markets with more competitors, suggesting a reversal of the conventional wisdom that collusion is easier with fewer firms.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0167-2681</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1879-1751</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.03.018</identifier><identifier>CODEN: JEBOD9</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V</publisher><subject>Collusion ; Competition ; Cournot oligopoly ; Economic behaviour ; Economic theory ; Experiments ; Market ; Oligopoly ; Output ; Punishment ; Studies ; Targeted punishment</subject><ispartof>Journal of economic behavior & organization, 2015-08, Vol.116, p.83-93</ispartof><rights>2015 Elsevier B.V.</rights><rights>Copyright Elsevier Sequoia S.A. Aug 2015</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c425t-bfc82652d9927953fe0d0d8ad2735942765d1ce447b0fbcd19d23549b04790943</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c425t-bfc82652d9927953fe0d0d8ad2735942765d1ce447b0fbcd19d23549b04790943</cites><orcidid>0000-0003-1190-8471</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268115000931$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,3537,27901,27902,30976,65306</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Roux, Catherine</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Thöni, Christian</creatorcontrib><title>Collusion among many firms: The disciplinary power of targeted punishment</title><title>Journal of economic behavior & organization</title><description>•We introduce the possibility of targeted punishment to experimental Cournot games.•We observe markets with two to eight competitors.•Targeted punishment leads to more collusion across all markets.•Beyond two competitors, the collusive effect of targeted punishment is stronger in larger groups.
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| ispartof | Journal of economic behavior & organization, 2015-08, Vol.116, p.83-93 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Applied Social Sciences Index & Abstracts (ASSIA); Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals |
| subjects | Collusion Competition Cournot oligopoly Economic behaviour Economic theory Experiments Market Oligopoly Output Punishment Studies Targeted punishment |
| title | Collusion among many firms: The disciplinary power of targeted punishment |
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