Regulation and corruption
Higher levels of government expenditures and more regulation naturally invite corruption, because they provide the opportunity for government officials to be paid off for regulatory favors, subsidies, and government contracts. Some countries have relatively large governments but lower levels of corr...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Public choice 2015-07, Vol.164 (1/2), p.75-85 |
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| container_title | Public choice |
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| creator | Holcombe, Randall G. Boudreaux, Christopher J. |
| description | Higher levels of government expenditures and more regulation naturally invite corruption, because they provide the opportunity for government officials to be paid off for regulatory favors, subsidies, and government contracts. Some countries have relatively large governments but lower levels of corruption. Scandinavian countries offer examples. While institutional differences may explain some of the cross-country differences in corruption, the most consistent relationship is that high levels of regulation are associated with more corruption. When looking at the effect of the size of government, it is the regulatory state, rather than the productive or redistributive state, that is associated with corruption. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11127-015-0263-x |
| format | Article |
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| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; EBSCOhost Political Science Complete; SpringerLink Journals; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Contracts Corruption Corruption in government Costs Democracy Economic activity Economics Economics and Finance Expenditures Federal regulation Federalism Fraud GDP Government Government spending Gross Domestic Product Political power Political Science Politics Public expenditure Public Finance Public sector Regulation Scandinavia Studies Subsidies |
| title | Regulation and corruption |
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