Shifting Power, Commitment Problems, and Preventive War

Many scholars argue that leaders' expectations about future shifts in the distribution of power can result in preventive war. If a leader expects her adversary to be significantly stronger in the future, the leader may choose to go to war with that adversary rather than bargain with a stronger...

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Veröffentlicht in:	International studies quarterly 2015-03, Vol.59 (1), p.124-132
Hauptverfasser:	Bell, Sam R., Johnson, Jesse C.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Expectations Hypothesis Intellectuals International relations INTERSTATE CONFLICT AND WAR Leaders Political leadership Political power Probability Quantitative Methods War
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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