Matching through position auctions
Using a mechanism design framework, we characterize how a profit-maximizing intermediary can design matching markets when each agent is privately informed about his quality as a partner. Sufficient conditions are provided that ensure a version of positive assortative matching (what we call truncated...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economic theory 2013-07, Vol.148 (4), p.1700-1713 |
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| container_end_page | 1713 |
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| container_issue | 4 |
| container_start_page | 1700 |
| container_title | Journal of economic theory |
| container_volume | 148 |
| creator | Johnson, T.R. |
| description | Using a mechanism design framework, we characterize how a profit-maximizing intermediary can design matching markets when each agent is privately informed about his quality as a partner. Sufficient conditions are provided that ensure a version of positive assortative matching (what we call truncated positive assortative matching) maximizes profits. Under these conditions, all-pay position auctions always implement the profit-maximizing allocation. Winners-pay position auctions, however, only do so in sufficiently large markets. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.009 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Journal of economic theory, 2013-07, Vol.148 (4), p.1700-1713 |
| issn | 0022-0531 1095-7235 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1701067586 |
| source | Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals |
| subjects | Agency theory Allocations Auctions Debt management Economic theory Economics Experimental methods Information analysis Intermediation Markets Matching Mechanism design Profit maximization Studies |
| title | Matching through position auctions |
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