Uncertainty, investment, and managerial incentives

This study provides evidence that managerial incentives, shaped by compensation contracts, help to explain the empirical relationship between uncertainty and investment. We develop a model in which the manager, compensated with an equity-based contract, makes investment decisions for a firm that fac...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of monetary economics 2015-01, Vol.69, p.121-137
Hauptverfasser:	Glover, Brent, Levine, Oliver
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Agency conflicts Corporate investment Economic incentives Economic models Economic theory Executive compensation Executives Idiosyncratic volatility Incentives Investment Investments Studies Uncertainty Volatility
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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