Nash bargaining for log-convex problems

We introduce log-convexity for bargaining problems. With the requirement of some basic regularity conditions, log-convexity is shown to be necessary and sufficient for Nash's axioms to determine a unique single-valued bargaining solution up to choices of bargaining powers. Specifically, we show...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Economic theory 2015-04, Vol.58 (3), p.413-440
Hauptverfasser:	Qin, Cheng-Zhong, Shi, Shuzhong, Tan, Guofu
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Analysis Asymmetry Axiomatic set theory Bargaining Duopoly Economic models Economic theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Enterprises Expected utility Game Theory Literature Microeconomics Nash equilibrium Nash, John Negotiations Pareto optimum Public Finance Research Article Social and Behav. Sciences Studies
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