Yesterday's Heroes: Compensation and Risk at Financial Firms

Many believe that compensation, misaligned from shareholders' value due to managerial entrenchment, caused financial firms to take risks before the financial crisis of 2008. We argue that, even in a classical principal-agent setting without entrenchment and with exogenous firm risk, riskier fir...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Journal of finance (New York) 2015-04, Vol.70 (2), p.839-879
Hauptverfasser:	CHENG, ING-HAW, HONG, HARRISON, SCHEINKMAN, JOSÉ A.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Agency theory Compensation Economic crisis Equity Financial crisis Managers Principal-agent theory Risk aversion Risk management Stock prices Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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