Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty
This paper studies asymmetric first-price menu auctions in the procurement environment where the buyer does not commit to a decision rule and asymmetric sellers have interdependent costs and statistically affiliated signals. Sellers compete in bidding a menu of contracts, where a contract specifies...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economic theory 2013-09, Vol.148 (5), p.2068-2095 |
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| container_title | Journal of economic theory |
| container_volume | 148 |
| creator | Han, Seungjin |
| description | This paper studies asymmetric first-price menu auctions in the procurement environment where the buyer does not commit to a decision rule and asymmetric sellers have interdependent costs and statistically affiliated signals. Sellers compete in bidding a menu of contracts, where a contract specifies a vector of characteristics and a payment required from the buyer for delivering these characteristics. The buyer does not commit ex-ante to a decision rule but rather upon observing all the menus offered by sellers chooses the best contract. This paper establishes the existence of a continuum of separating monotone equilibria in this game bounded above by the jointly ex-post efficient outcome and below by the jointly interim efficient outcome. It shows that the jointly ex-post efficient equilibrium outcome is the only ex-post renegotiation-proof outcome and it is also ex-ante robust to all continuation equilibria. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.014 |
| format | Article |
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Sellers compete in bidding a menu of contracts, where a contract specifies a vector of characteristics and a payment required from the buyer for delivering these characteristics. The buyer does not commit ex-ante to a decision rule but rather upon observing all the menus offered by sellers chooses the best contract. This paper establishes the existence of a continuum of separating monotone equilibria in this game bounded above by the jointly ex-post efficient outcome and below by the jointly interim efficient outcome. It shows that the jointly ex-post efficient equilibrium outcome is the only ex-post renegotiation-proof outcome and it is also ex-ante robust to all continuation equilibria.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0022-0531</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1095-7235</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.014</identifier><identifier>CODEN: JECTAQ</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>New York: Elsevier Inc</publisher><subject>Asymmetric information ; Asymmetry ; Auctions ; Bidding ; Contracts ; Decision theory ; Economic theory ; Economics ; Equilibrium theory ; Ex-ante robustness ; First-price menu auction ; Game theory ; Games ; Interdependent values ; Joint ex-post renegotiation proofness ; Mathematical analysis ; Menus ; Monotone equilibria ; Payments ; Procurement ; Purchasing ; Renegotiation ; Studies ; Vectors (mathematics)</subject><ispartof>Journal of economic theory, 2013-09, Vol.148 (5), p.2068-2095</ispartof><rights>2013 Elsevier Inc.</rights><rights>Copyright Elsevier Science Publishing Company, Inc. 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It shows that the jointly ex-post efficient equilibrium outcome is the only ex-post renegotiation-proof outcome and it is also ex-ante robust to all continuation equilibria.</description><subject>Asymmetric information</subject><subject>Asymmetry</subject><subject>Auctions</subject><subject>Bidding</subject><subject>Contracts</subject><subject>Decision theory</subject><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Economics</subject><subject>Equilibrium theory</subject><subject>Ex-ante robustness</subject><subject>First-price menu auction</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Games</subject><subject>Interdependent values</subject><subject>Joint ex-post renegotiation proofness</subject><subject>Mathematical analysis</subject><subject>Menus</subject><subject>Monotone equilibria</subject><subject>Payments</subject><subject>Procurement</subject><subject>Purchasing</subject><subject>Renegotiation</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Vectors (mathematics)</subject><issn>0022-0531</issn><issn>1095-7235</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2013</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNqFkEtLLDEQRoMoOHf0B7hrcOOm28qrk-BGEV8guNF1yKSrIc10tybpC_Pvb4Zx5eK6SqU4XxV1CLmg0FCg7fXQDJgbBpQ3oBqg4oisKBhZK8blMVkBMFaD5PSU_ElpAKBUtu2K3N6l3ThijsFXfYgp15-lxGrEaanc4nOYp1QtU4exCtMecxnL32PMrjR2Z-Skd9uE59_vmnw8PrzfP9evb08v93evtRdG57o1UvXQ603rdNlsjBGdEVpqxntwGpziCnvOmGm5cnrjvKZ8Y4TwXnZiA3xNrg5zP-P8tWDKdgzJ43brJpyXZGmrqFSyZfR3VAiqQWtuCnr5Ax3mJU7lkEJxIZgBzgpFD5SPc0oRe1skjS7uLAW7128HW_TbvX4Lyhb9JXNzyGCR8jdgtMkHLN66ENFn283hP-l_naCLZw</recordid><startdate>20130901</startdate><enddate>20130901</enddate><creator>Han, Seungjin</creator><general>Elsevier Inc</general><general>Elsevier Science Publishing Company, Inc</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>7TA</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>JG9</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20130901</creationdate><title>Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty</title><author>Han, Seungjin</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c498t-6957f0f8b6a81569994d9485823f0a80a737ef3229637a8bac813b944cc5d4b03</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2013</creationdate><topic>Asymmetric information</topic><topic>Asymmetry</topic><topic>Auctions</topic><topic>Bidding</topic><topic>Contracts</topic><topic>Decision theory</topic><topic>Economic theory</topic><topic>Economics</topic><topic>Equilibrium theory</topic><topic>Ex-ante robustness</topic><topic>First-price menu auction</topic><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>Games</topic><topic>Interdependent values</topic><topic>Joint ex-post renegotiation proofness</topic><topic>Mathematical analysis</topic><topic>Menus</topic><topic>Monotone equilibria</topic><topic>Payments</topic><topic>Procurement</topic><topic>Purchasing</topic><topic>Renegotiation</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Vectors (mathematics)</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Han, Seungjin</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Materials Business File</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>Materials Research Database</collection><jtitle>Journal of economic theory</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Han, Seungjin</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty</atitle><jtitle>Journal of economic theory</jtitle><date>2013-09-01</date><risdate>2013</risdate><volume>148</volume><issue>5</issue><spage>2068</spage><epage>2095</epage><pages>2068-2095</pages><issn>0022-0531</issn><eissn>1095-7235</eissn><coden>JECTAQ</coden><abstract>This paper studies asymmetric first-price menu auctions in the procurement environment where the buyer does not commit to a decision rule and asymmetric sellers have interdependent costs and statistically affiliated signals. 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| ispartof | Journal of economic theory, 2013-09, Vol.148 (5), p.2068-2095 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Access via ScienceDirect (Elsevier) |
| subjects | Asymmetric information Asymmetry Auctions Bidding Contracts Decision theory Economic theory Economics Equilibrium theory Ex-ante robustness First-price menu auction Game theory Games Interdependent values Joint ex-post renegotiation proofness Mathematical analysis Menus Monotone equilibria Payments Procurement Purchasing Renegotiation Studies Vectors (mathematics) |
| title | Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty |
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