Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets
This paper studies welfare tradeoffs in two-sided, one-to-one matching markets. We begin by providing theoretical upper bounds on a utilitarian price of stability, and show that these bounds vary with the composition of participants’ ordinal preference lists. We then turn to simulation experiments t...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Theory and decision 2013-04, Vol.74 (4), p.565-589 |
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| container_title | Theory and decision |
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| creator | Boudreau, James W. Knoblauch, Vicki |
| description | This paper studies welfare tradeoffs in two-sided, one-to-one matching markets. We begin by providing theoretical upper bounds on a utilitarian price of stability, and show that these bounds vary with the composition of participants’ ordinal preference lists. We then turn to simulation experiments to describe how changes in basic characteristics of agents’ preferences can increase or decrease the
average
price of stability as measured by both utilitarian and Rawlsian welfare criteria. Our results indicate that markets featuring moderate degrees of correlation and positive intercorrelation in the preferences of participants exhibit the steepest tradeoffs between stability and utilitarian welfare and between stability and Rawlsian welfare. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11238-012-9319-2 |
| format | Article |
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average
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average
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average
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| ispartof | Theory and decision, 2013-04, Vol.74 (4), p.565-589 |
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| subjects | Applied sciences Behavioral/Experimental Economics Correlation Criteria Decision theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Exact sciences and technology Finance Game Theory Insurance Lists Management Market theory Markets Matching Medical students Operational research and scientific management Operational research. Management science Operations Research/Decision Theory Preferences Price stability Price theory Simulation Social and Behav. Sciences Stability Statistics for Business Studies Tradeoff analysis Upper bounds Utilitarianism |
| title | Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets |
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