Lending relationships and analysts’ forecasts

We examine earnings forecasts by sell-side analysts employed by a bank with a lending relationship with the covered firms. We find that lender-affiliated analysts' forecasts are more accurate than forecasts by their unaffiliated peers after establishment of the lending relationship. Evidence fr...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Journal of financial intermediation 2015-01, Vol.24 (1), p.71-88
Hauptverfasser: Ergungor, Ozgur E., Madureira, Leonardo, Nayar, Nandkumar, Singh, Ajai K.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page 88
container_issue 1
container_start_page 71
container_title Journal of financial intermediation
container_volume 24
creator Ergungor, Ozgur E.
Madureira, Leonardo
Nayar, Nandkumar
Singh, Ajai K.
description We examine earnings forecasts by sell-side analysts employed by a bank with a lending relationship with the covered firms. We find that lender-affiliated analysts' forecasts are more accurate than forecasts by their unaffiliated peers after establishment of the lending relationship. Evidence from exogenous variation suggests that the relationship is causal. Lender-affiliated analysts are also more likely to issue pessimistic forecasts below their peers' consensus. These forecasts are likely to be followed by below-consensus earnings. The results suggest that lender-affiliated analysts enjoy an informational advantage that spills over from lending activities of banks.
doi_str_mv 10.1016/j.jfi.2014.02.001
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1663903965</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>1663903965</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c440t-497eb97184f95ea4548c5a7481e9e1a63564572dacbfab9b52068a126105edf33</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpdkMtKxEAQRRtRcBz9AHcDbtwkU9XP9FIGXzDgRtdNJ-nWhEwydieL2fkb_p5fYodx5aKoKjhcLoeQa4QcAeW6zVvf5BSQ50BzADwhCwQtM-CKnc43p5kWip2TixjbBKDkfEHWW9fXTf--Cq6zYzP08aPZx5Xt6zS2O8Qx_nx9r_wQXGXTc0nOvO2iu_rbS_L2cP-6ecq2L4_Pm7ttVnEOY8a1cqVWWHCvhbNc8KISVvECnXZoJROSC0VrW5XelroUFGRhkUoE4WrP2JLcHnP3YficXBzNromV6zrbu2GKBqVkGpiWIqE3_9B2mEIqP1OCIQJTkCg8UlUYYgzOm31odjYcDIKZFZrWJIVmVmiAmmSI_QKfAGQ5</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1653110370</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Lending relationships and analysts’ forecasts</title><source>Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals Complete</source><creator>Ergungor, Ozgur E. ; Madureira, Leonardo ; Nayar, Nandkumar ; Singh, Ajai K.</creator><creatorcontrib>Ergungor, Ozgur E. ; Madureira, Leonardo ; Nayar, Nandkumar ; Singh, Ajai K.</creatorcontrib><description>We examine earnings forecasts by sell-side analysts employed by a bank with a lending relationship with the covered firms. We find that lender-affiliated analysts' forecasts are more accurate than forecasts by their unaffiliated peers after establishment of the lending relationship. Evidence from exogenous variation suggests that the relationship is causal. Lender-affiliated analysts are also more likely to issue pessimistic forecasts below their peers' consensus. These forecasts are likely to be followed by below-consensus earnings. The results suggest that lender-affiliated analysts enjoy an informational advantage that spills over from lending activities of banks.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1042-9573</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1096-0473</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2014.02.001</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>San Diego: Elsevier BV</publisher><subject>Bank loans ; Banking ; Banking industry ; Banks ; Earnings ; Earnings forecasting ; Enterprises ; Financial analysis ; Forecasts ; Information sharing ; Studies</subject><ispartof>Journal of financial intermediation, 2015-01, Vol.24 (1), p.71-88</ispartof><rights>2014 Elsevier Inc.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c440t-497eb97184f95ea4548c5a7481e9e1a63564572dacbfab9b52068a126105edf33</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c440t-497eb97184f95ea4548c5a7481e9e1a63564572dacbfab9b52068a126105edf33</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,27901,27902</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Ergungor, Ozgur E.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Madureira, Leonardo</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Nayar, Nandkumar</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Singh, Ajai K.</creatorcontrib><title>Lending relationships and analysts’ forecasts</title><title>Journal of financial intermediation</title><description>We examine earnings forecasts by sell-side analysts employed by a bank with a lending relationship with the covered firms. We find that lender-affiliated analysts' forecasts are more accurate than forecasts by their unaffiliated peers after establishment of the lending relationship. Evidence from exogenous variation suggests that the relationship is causal. Lender-affiliated analysts are also more likely to issue pessimistic forecasts below their peers' consensus. These forecasts are likely to be followed by below-consensus earnings. The results suggest that lender-affiliated analysts enjoy an informational advantage that spills over from lending activities of banks.</description><subject>Bank loans</subject><subject>Banking</subject><subject>Banking industry</subject><subject>Banks</subject><subject>Earnings</subject><subject>Earnings forecasting</subject><subject>Enterprises</subject><subject>Financial analysis</subject><subject>Forecasts</subject><subject>Information sharing</subject><subject>Studies</subject><issn>1042-9573</issn><issn>1096-0473</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2015</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNpdkMtKxEAQRRtRcBz9AHcDbtwkU9XP9FIGXzDgRtdNJ-nWhEwydieL2fkb_p5fYodx5aKoKjhcLoeQa4QcAeW6zVvf5BSQ50BzADwhCwQtM-CKnc43p5kWip2TixjbBKDkfEHWW9fXTf--Cq6zYzP08aPZx5Xt6zS2O8Qx_nx9r_wQXGXTc0nOvO2iu_rbS_L2cP-6ecq2L4_Pm7ttVnEOY8a1cqVWWHCvhbNc8KISVvECnXZoJROSC0VrW5XelroUFGRhkUoE4WrP2JLcHnP3YficXBzNromV6zrbu2GKBqVkGpiWIqE3_9B2mEIqP1OCIQJTkCg8UlUYYgzOm31odjYcDIKZFZrWJIVmVmiAmmSI_QKfAGQ5</recordid><startdate>20150101</startdate><enddate>20150101</enddate><creator>Ergungor, Ozgur E.</creator><creator>Madureira, Leonardo</creator><creator>Nayar, Nandkumar</creator><creator>Singh, Ajai K.</creator><general>Elsevier BV</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20150101</creationdate><title>Lending relationships and analysts’ forecasts</title><author>Ergungor, Ozgur E. ; Madureira, Leonardo ; Nayar, Nandkumar ; Singh, Ajai K.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c440t-497eb97184f95ea4548c5a7481e9e1a63564572dacbfab9b52068a126105edf33</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2015</creationdate><topic>Bank loans</topic><topic>Banking</topic><topic>Banking industry</topic><topic>Banks</topic><topic>Earnings</topic><topic>Earnings forecasting</topic><topic>Enterprises</topic><topic>Financial analysis</topic><topic>Forecasts</topic><topic>Information sharing</topic><topic>Studies</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Ergungor, Ozgur E.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Madureira, Leonardo</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Nayar, Nandkumar</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Singh, Ajai K.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Journal of financial intermediation</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Ergungor, Ozgur E.</au><au>Madureira, Leonardo</au><au>Nayar, Nandkumar</au><au>Singh, Ajai K.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Lending relationships and analysts’ forecasts</atitle><jtitle>Journal of financial intermediation</jtitle><date>2015-01-01</date><risdate>2015</risdate><volume>24</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>71</spage><epage>88</epage><pages>71-88</pages><issn>1042-9573</issn><eissn>1096-0473</eissn><abstract>We examine earnings forecasts by sell-side analysts employed by a bank with a lending relationship with the covered firms. We find that lender-affiliated analysts' forecasts are more accurate than forecasts by their unaffiliated peers after establishment of the lending relationship. Evidence from exogenous variation suggests that the relationship is causal. Lender-affiliated analysts are also more likely to issue pessimistic forecasts below their peers' consensus. These forecasts are likely to be followed by below-consensus earnings. The results suggest that lender-affiliated analysts enjoy an informational advantage that spills over from lending activities of banks.</abstract><cop>San Diego</cop><pub>Elsevier BV</pub><doi>10.1016/j.jfi.2014.02.001</doi><tpages>18</tpages></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 1042-9573
ispartof Journal of financial intermediation, 2015-01, Vol.24 (1), p.71-88
issn 1042-9573
1096-0473
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1663903965
source Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals Complete
subjects Bank loans
Banking
Banking industry
Banks
Earnings
Earnings forecasting
Enterprises
Financial analysis
Forecasts
Information sharing
Studies
title Lending relationships and analysts’ forecasts
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-02-14T11%3A51%3A06IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Lending%20relationships%20and%20analysts%E2%80%99%20forecasts&rft.jtitle=Journal%20of%20financial%20intermediation&rft.au=Ergungor,%20Ozgur%20E.&rft.date=2015-01-01&rft.volume=24&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=71&rft.epage=88&rft.pages=71-88&rft.issn=1042-9573&rft.eissn=1096-0473&rft_id=info:doi/10.1016/j.jfi.2014.02.001&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E1663903965%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1653110370&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true