FREEDOM AND CONTROL: ON THE MODALITY OF FREE WILL
Free will is a problem of modality, hampered by a commitment to modal dualism: the view that there is only necessity and pure contingency. If we have necessity, then things couldn't have been otherwise, against the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (AP). If there is complete contingency, the...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | American philosophical quarterly (Oxford) 2015-01, Vol.52 (1), p.1-11 |
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| container_title | American philosophical quarterly (Oxford) |
| container_volume | 52 |
| creator | Mumford, Stephen Anjum, Rani Lill |
| description | Free will is a problem of modality, hampered by a commitment to modal dualism: the view that there is only necessity and pure contingency. If we have necessity, then things couldn't have been otherwise, against the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (AP). If there is complete contingency, then the agent seems to have no control over her actions, against the principle of Ultimate Authorship (UA). There is a third modality in natural causal processes, however. AP and UA can be reconciled if we allow both causation and agency to involve the dispositional modality. |
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| ispartof | American philosophical quarterly (Oxford), 2015-01, Vol.52 (1), p.1-11 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing |
| subjects | Agency Causal explanation Dualism Freedom Freedoms Philosophy Principles Social theory |
| title | FREEDOM AND CONTROL: ON THE MODALITY OF FREE WILL |
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