The role of causal models in multiple judgments under uncertainty
•We derive and test predictions of a causal Bayes net account of judgment under uncertainty across multiple observations.•Causal explanation of false positives promoted stability in probability estimates across multiple observations.•Statistics without an apparent cause were treated as stochastic in...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Cognition 2014-12, Vol.133 (3), p.611-620 |
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creator | Hayes, Brett K. Hawkins, Guy E. Newell, Ben R. Pasqualino, Martina Rehder, Bob |
description | •We derive and test predictions of a causal Bayes net account of judgment under uncertainty across multiple observations.•Causal explanation of false positives promoted stability in probability estimates across multiple observations.•Statistics without an apparent cause were treated as stochastic in intuitive probability judgments.•Identical observed events can lead to different probability judgments depending on causal beliefs about the events.
Two studies examined a novel prediction of the causal Bayes net approach to judgments under uncertainty, namely that causal knowledge affects the interpretation of statistical evidence obtained over multiple observations. Participants estimated the conditional probability of an uncertain event (breast cancer) given information about the base rate, hit rate (probability of a positive mammogram given cancer) and false positive rate (probability of a positive mammogram in the absence of cancer). Conditional probability estimates were made after observing one or two positive mammograms. Participants exhibited a causal stability effect: there was a smaller increase in estimates of the probability of cancer over multiple positive mammograms when a causal explanation of false positives was provided. This was the case when the judgments were made by different participants (Experiment 1) or by the same participants (Experiment 2). These results show that identical patterns of observed events can lead to different estimates of event probability depending on beliefs about the generative causes of the observations. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.cognition.2014.08.011 |
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Two studies examined a novel prediction of the causal Bayes net approach to judgments under uncertainty, namely that causal knowledge affects the interpretation of statistical evidence obtained over multiple observations. Participants estimated the conditional probability of an uncertain event (breast cancer) given information about the base rate, hit rate (probability of a positive mammogram given cancer) and false positive rate (probability of a positive mammogram in the absence of cancer). Conditional probability estimates were made after observing one or two positive mammograms. Participants exhibited a causal stability effect: there was a smaller increase in estimates of the probability of cancer over multiple positive mammograms when a causal explanation of false positives was provided. This was the case when the judgments were made by different participants (Experiment 1) or by the same participants (Experiment 2). These results show that identical patterns of observed events can lead to different estimates of event probability depending on beliefs about the generative causes of the observations.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0010-0277</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1873-7838</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2014.08.011</identifier><identifier>PMID: 25238316</identifier><identifier>CODEN: CGTNAU</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V</publisher><subject>Bayes nets ; Bayes Theorem ; Beliefs ; Biological and medical sciences ; Cancer ; Causal models ; Cognition ; Cognition. Intelligence ; Decision making. Choice ; Estimation ; Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology ; Humans ; Intuitive statistics ; Judgement ; Judgment ; Judgment under uncertainty ; Models, Psychological ; Probability ; Problem Solving ; Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry ; Psychology. Psychophysiology ; Uncertainty ; Young Adult</subject><ispartof>Cognition, 2014-12, Vol.133 (3), p.611-620</ispartof><rights>2014 Elsevier B.V.</rights><rights>2015 INIST-CNRS</rights><rights>Copyright © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c467t-2219d67103a38eca5bdac7a7a5a7ee18c2890b926a7c84311e1ac4c528d7e9e63</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c467t-2219d67103a38eca5bdac7a7a5a7ee18c2890b926a7c84311e1ac4c528d7e9e63</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027714001681$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,3537,27901,27902,65306</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://pascal-francis.inist.fr/vibad/index.php?action=getRecordDetail&idt=28902406$$DView record in Pascal Francis$$Hfree_for_read</backlink><backlink>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25238316$$D View this record in MEDLINE/PubMed$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Hayes, Brett K.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Hawkins, Guy E.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Newell, Ben R.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Pasqualino, Martina</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Rehder, Bob</creatorcontrib><title>The role of causal models in multiple judgments under uncertainty</title><title>Cognition</title><addtitle>Cognition</addtitle><description>•We derive and test predictions of a causal Bayes net account of judgment under uncertainty across multiple observations.•Causal explanation of false positives promoted stability in probability estimates across multiple observations.•Statistics without an apparent cause were treated as stochastic in intuitive probability judgments.•Identical observed events can lead to different probability judgments depending on causal beliefs about the events.
Two studies examined a novel prediction of the causal Bayes net approach to judgments under uncertainty, namely that causal knowledge affects the interpretation of statistical evidence obtained over multiple observations. Participants estimated the conditional probability of an uncertain event (breast cancer) given information about the base rate, hit rate (probability of a positive mammogram given cancer) and false positive rate (probability of a positive mammogram in the absence of cancer). Conditional probability estimates were made after observing one or two positive mammograms. Participants exhibited a causal stability effect: there was a smaller increase in estimates of the probability of cancer over multiple positive mammograms when a causal explanation of false positives was provided. This was the case when the judgments were made by different participants (Experiment 1) or by the same participants (Experiment 2). These results show that identical patterns of observed events can lead to different estimates of event probability depending on beliefs about the generative causes of the observations.</description><subject>Bayes nets</subject><subject>Bayes Theorem</subject><subject>Beliefs</subject><subject>Biological and medical sciences</subject><subject>Cancer</subject><subject>Causal models</subject><subject>Cognition</subject><subject>Cognition. Intelligence</subject><subject>Decision making. Choice</subject><subject>Estimation</subject><subject>Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology</subject><subject>Humans</subject><subject>Intuitive statistics</subject><subject>Judgement</subject><subject>Judgment</subject><subject>Judgment under uncertainty</subject><subject>Models, Psychological</subject><subject>Probability</subject><subject>Problem Solving</subject><subject>Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry</subject><subject>Psychology. Psychophysiology</subject><subject>Uncertainty</subject><subject>Young Adult</subject><issn>0010-0277</issn><issn>1873-7838</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2014</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>EIF</sourceid><recordid>eNqNkc1O3DAURq0KVKbAK7TZIHWTcK-dsZ3lCEGLhMQG1pbHvkM9SuKpnVTi7evRTOkSNvbC5_74O4x9Q2gQUF5vGxdfxjCFODYcsG1AN4D4iS1QK1ErLfQJWwAg1MCVOmNfct4CQMuV_szO-JILLVAu2OrpF1Up9lTFTeXsnG1fDdFTn6swVsPcT2FXHrezfxlonHI1j55SOR2lyYZxer1gpxvbZ7o83ufs-e726eZn_fD44_5m9VC7Vqqp5hw7LxWCsEKTs8u1t05ZZZdWEaF2XHew7ri0yulWIBJa17ol115RR1Kcs--HvrsUf8-UJzOE7Kjv7UhxzgalBBD7L34AbRVgieIjKO86CSXjgqoD6lLMOdHG7FIYbHo1CGZvxWzNmxWzt2JAm2KlVH49DpnXA_m3un8aCnB1BGx2tt8kO7qQ_3MlGt7CnlsduOKH_gRKJrtAxYUPidxkfAzvLvMXq7et8Q</recordid><startdate>20141201</startdate><enddate>20141201</enddate><creator>Hayes, Brett K.</creator><creator>Hawkins, Guy E.</creator><creator>Newell, Ben R.</creator><creator>Pasqualino, Martina</creator><creator>Rehder, Bob</creator><general>Elsevier B.V</general><general>Elsevier</general><scope>IQODW</scope><scope>CGR</scope><scope>CUY</scope><scope>CVF</scope><scope>ECM</scope><scope>EIF</scope><scope>NPM</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7X8</scope><scope>7TK</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20141201</creationdate><title>The role of causal models in multiple judgments under uncertainty</title><author>Hayes, Brett K. ; Hawkins, Guy E. ; Newell, Ben R. ; Pasqualino, Martina ; Rehder, Bob</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c467t-2219d67103a38eca5bdac7a7a5a7ee18c2890b926a7c84311e1ac4c528d7e9e63</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2014</creationdate><topic>Bayes nets</topic><topic>Bayes Theorem</topic><topic>Beliefs</topic><topic>Biological and medical sciences</topic><topic>Cancer</topic><topic>Causal models</topic><topic>Cognition</topic><topic>Cognition. Intelligence</topic><topic>Decision making. Choice</topic><topic>Estimation</topic><topic>Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology</topic><topic>Humans</topic><topic>Intuitive statistics</topic><topic>Judgement</topic><topic>Judgment</topic><topic>Judgment under uncertainty</topic><topic>Models, Psychological</topic><topic>Probability</topic><topic>Problem Solving</topic><topic>Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry</topic><topic>Psychology. Psychophysiology</topic><topic>Uncertainty</topic><topic>Young Adult</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Hayes, Brett K.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Hawkins, Guy E.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Newell, Ben R.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Pasqualino, Martina</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Rehder, Bob</creatorcontrib><collection>Pascal-Francis</collection><collection>Medline</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE (Ovid)</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>PubMed</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>MEDLINE - Academic</collection><collection>Neurosciences Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Cognition</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Hayes, Brett K.</au><au>Hawkins, Guy E.</au><au>Newell, Ben R.</au><au>Pasqualino, Martina</au><au>Rehder, Bob</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>The role of causal models in multiple judgments under uncertainty</atitle><jtitle>Cognition</jtitle><addtitle>Cognition</addtitle><date>2014-12-01</date><risdate>2014</risdate><volume>133</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>611</spage><epage>620</epage><pages>611-620</pages><issn>0010-0277</issn><eissn>1873-7838</eissn><coden>CGTNAU</coden><abstract>•We derive and test predictions of a causal Bayes net account of judgment under uncertainty across multiple observations.•Causal explanation of false positives promoted stability in probability estimates across multiple observations.•Statistics without an apparent cause were treated as stochastic in intuitive probability judgments.•Identical observed events can lead to different probability judgments depending on causal beliefs about the events.
Two studies examined a novel prediction of the causal Bayes net approach to judgments under uncertainty, namely that causal knowledge affects the interpretation of statistical evidence obtained over multiple observations. Participants estimated the conditional probability of an uncertain event (breast cancer) given information about the base rate, hit rate (probability of a positive mammogram given cancer) and false positive rate (probability of a positive mammogram in the absence of cancer). Conditional probability estimates were made after observing one or two positive mammograms. Participants exhibited a causal stability effect: there was a smaller increase in estimates of the probability of cancer over multiple positive mammograms when a causal explanation of false positives was provided. This was the case when the judgments were made by different participants (Experiment 1) or by the same participants (Experiment 2). These results show that identical patterns of observed events can lead to different estimates of event probability depending on beliefs about the generative causes of the observations.</abstract><cop>Amsterdam</cop><pub>Elsevier B.V</pub><pmid>25238316</pmid><doi>10.1016/j.cognition.2014.08.011</doi><tpages>10</tpages></addata></record> |
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subjects | Bayes nets Bayes Theorem Beliefs Biological and medical sciences Cancer Causal models Cognition Cognition. Intelligence Decision making. Choice Estimation Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology Humans Intuitive statistics Judgement Judgment Judgment under uncertainty Models, Psychological Probability Problem Solving Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry Psychology. Psychophysiology Uncertainty Young Adult |
title | The role of causal models in multiple judgments under uncertainty |
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