The role of causal models in multiple judgments under uncertainty

•We derive and test predictions of a causal Bayes net account of judgment under uncertainty across multiple observations.•Causal explanation of false positives promoted stability in probability estimates across multiple observations.•Statistics without an apparent cause were treated as stochastic in...

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Veröffentlicht in:Cognition 2014-12, Vol.133 (3), p.611-620
Hauptverfasser: Hayes, Brett K., Hawkins, Guy E., Newell, Ben R., Pasqualino, Martina, Rehder, Bob
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container_end_page 620
container_issue 3
container_start_page 611
container_title Cognition
container_volume 133
creator Hayes, Brett K.
Hawkins, Guy E.
Newell, Ben R.
Pasqualino, Martina
Rehder, Bob
description •We derive and test predictions of a causal Bayes net account of judgment under uncertainty across multiple observations.•Causal explanation of false positives promoted stability in probability estimates across multiple observations.•Statistics without an apparent cause were treated as stochastic in intuitive probability judgments.•Identical observed events can lead to different probability judgments depending on causal beliefs about the events. Two studies examined a novel prediction of the causal Bayes net approach to judgments under uncertainty, namely that causal knowledge affects the interpretation of statistical evidence obtained over multiple observations. Participants estimated the conditional probability of an uncertain event (breast cancer) given information about the base rate, hit rate (probability of a positive mammogram given cancer) and false positive rate (probability of a positive mammogram in the absence of cancer). Conditional probability estimates were made after observing one or two positive mammograms. Participants exhibited a causal stability effect: there was a smaller increase in estimates of the probability of cancer over multiple positive mammograms when a causal explanation of false positives was provided. This was the case when the judgments were made by different participants (Experiment 1) or by the same participants (Experiment 2). These results show that identical patterns of observed events can lead to different estimates of event probability depending on beliefs about the generative causes of the observations.
doi_str_mv 10.1016/j.cognition.2014.08.011
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Intelligence</topic><topic>Decision making. Choice</topic><topic>Estimation</topic><topic>Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology</topic><topic>Humans</topic><topic>Intuitive statistics</topic><topic>Judgement</topic><topic>Judgment</topic><topic>Judgment under uncertainty</topic><topic>Models, Psychological</topic><topic>Probability</topic><topic>Problem Solving</topic><topic>Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry</topic><topic>Psychology. Psychophysiology</topic><topic>Uncertainty</topic><topic>Young Adult</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Hayes, Brett K.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Hawkins, Guy E.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Newell, Ben R.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Pasqualino, Martina</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Rehder, Bob</creatorcontrib><collection>Pascal-Francis</collection><collection>Medline</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE (Ovid)</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>PubMed</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>MEDLINE - Academic</collection><collection>Neurosciences Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Cognition</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Hayes, Brett K.</au><au>Hawkins, Guy E.</au><au>Newell, Ben R.</au><au>Pasqualino, Martina</au><au>Rehder, Bob</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>The role of causal models in multiple judgments under uncertainty</atitle><jtitle>Cognition</jtitle><addtitle>Cognition</addtitle><date>2014-12-01</date><risdate>2014</risdate><volume>133</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>611</spage><epage>620</epage><pages>611-620</pages><issn>0010-0277</issn><eissn>1873-7838</eissn><coden>CGTNAU</coden><abstract>•We derive and test predictions of a causal Bayes net account of judgment under uncertainty across multiple observations.•Causal explanation of false positives promoted stability in probability estimates across multiple observations.•Statistics without an apparent cause were treated as stochastic in intuitive probability judgments.•Identical observed events can lead to different probability judgments depending on causal beliefs about the events. 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source MEDLINE; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals
subjects Bayes nets
Bayes Theorem
Beliefs
Biological and medical sciences
Cancer
Causal models
Cognition
Cognition. Intelligence
Decision making. Choice
Estimation
Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology
Humans
Intuitive statistics
Judgement
Judgment
Judgment under uncertainty
Models, Psychological
Probability
Problem Solving
Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry
Psychology. Psychophysiology
Uncertainty
Young Adult
title The role of causal models in multiple judgments under uncertainty
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