Influential Opinion Leaders

We present a two-stage coordination game in which early choices of experts with special interests are observed by followers who move in the second stage. We show that the equilibrium outcome is biased towards the experts' interests even though followers know the distribution of expert interests...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Economic journal (London) 2014-12, Vol.124 (581), p.1147-1167
Hauptverfasser:	Loeper, Antoine, Steiner, Jakub, Stewart, Colin
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Bias Coordinate systems Decision analysis Diffusion theory Distribution Early adopters Economic models Equilibrium Experts Externality Game theory Observational learning Observed choices Opinion leaders Products Regime change Social activism Social demonstrations Social movements Social protests Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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