Who's Really in Charge? Audit Committee versus CFO Power and Audit Fees

Although regulation makes audit committees responsible for determining and negotiating audit fees, researchers and practitioners express concerns that CFOs continue to control these negotiations. Thus, regulation may give investors a false sense of security regarding auditor independence. We utilize...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Accounting review 2014-11, Vol.89 (6), p.2057-2085
Hauptverfasser: Beck, Matthew J., Mauldin, Elaine G.
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container_title The Accounting review
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Mauldin, Elaine G.
description Although regulation makes audit committees responsible for determining and negotiating audit fees, researchers and practitioners express concerns that CFOs continue to control these negotiations. Thus, regulation may give investors a false sense of security regarding auditor independence. We utilize the recent financial crisis and economic recession as an exogenous shock that allows us to shed light on the relative influence of the audit committee and the CFO on fee negotiations. During the recession, we find larger fee reductions in the presence of more powerful CFOs, and smaller fee reductions in the presence of more powerful audit committees. We also find the CFO or the audit committee primarily influences fees when their counterpart is less powerful. Our findings suggest a more complex relationship between the CFO and the audit committee than current regulations recognize and cast doubt on the ability of regulation to force one structure on the negotiation process.
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source Jstor Complete Legacy; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete
subjects Accountant independence
Audit committees
Audit fees
Auditing
Auditing standards
Audits
Business audits
Business risks
Chief financial officers
Economic recessions
Fees
Financial audits
Financial crisis
Internal audits
Investors
Management audits
Negotiations
Professional fees
Recession
Recessions
Regulation
Scandals
Security
Studies
Tax audits
title Who's Really in Charge? Audit Committee versus CFO Power and Audit Fees
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