Who's Really in Charge? Audit Committee versus CFO Power and Audit Fees
Although regulation makes audit committees responsible for determining and negotiating audit fees, researchers and practitioners express concerns that CFOs continue to control these negotiations. Thus, regulation may give investors a false sense of security regarding auditor independence. We utilize...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The Accounting review 2014-11, Vol.89 (6), p.2057-2085 |
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description | Although regulation makes audit committees responsible for determining and negotiating audit fees, researchers and practitioners express concerns that CFOs continue to control these negotiations. Thus, regulation may give investors a false sense of security regarding auditor independence. We utilize the recent financial crisis and economic recession as an exogenous shock that allows us to shed light on the relative influence of the audit committee and the CFO on fee negotiations. During the recession, we find larger fee reductions in the presence of more powerful CFOs, and smaller fee reductions in the presence of more powerful audit committees. We also find the CFO or the audit committee primarily influences fees when their counterpart is less powerful. Our findings suggest a more complex relationship between the CFO and the audit committee than current regulations recognize and cast doubt on the ability of regulation to force one structure on the negotiation process. |
doi_str_mv | 10.2308/accr-50834 |
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We also find the CFO or the audit committee primarily influences fees when their counterpart is less powerful. 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Our findings suggest a more complex relationship between the CFO and the audit committee than current regulations recognize and cast doubt on the ability of regulation to force one structure on the negotiation process.</description><subject>Accountant independence</subject><subject>Audit committees</subject><subject>Audit fees</subject><subject>Auditing</subject><subject>Auditing standards</subject><subject>Audits</subject><subject>Business audits</subject><subject>Business risks</subject><subject>Chief financial officers</subject><subject>Economic recessions</subject><subject>Fees</subject><subject>Financial audits</subject><subject>Financial crisis</subject><subject>Internal audits</subject><subject>Investors</subject><subject>Management audits</subject><subject>Negotiations</subject><subject>Professional fees</subject><subject>Recession</subject><subject>Recessions</subject><subject>Regulation</subject><subject>Scandals</subject><subject>Security</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Tax audits</subject><issn>0001-4826</issn><issn>1558-7967</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2014</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNpd0E1Lw0AQBuBFFKzVi3dhwYMiRPd7NycpwVahUBHFY9huJjYl6dbdROm_N7XFg6dh4GHm5UXonJJbxom5s86FRBLDxQEaUClNolOlD9GAEEITYZg6RicxLvtVqJQO0OR94a8ifgFb1xtcrXC2sOED7vGoK6oWZ75pqrYFwF8QYhdxNp7hZ_8NAdtVsUdjgHiKjkpbRzjbzyF6Gz-8Zo_JdDZ5ykbTxAkh2oSWlHDNjTbzlInCSMnnhXS2z-2s1mkJWkldEk0JKYVW6VwxphRzEoS0heJDdL27uw7-s4PY5k0VHdS1XYHvYk4VV0IRnm7p5T-69F1Y9el6xaQx_Svaq5udcsHHGKDM16FqbNjklOTbTvNtp_lvpz2-2OFlbH34k0wIpZmR_Ad9BnA_</recordid><startdate>20141101</startdate><enddate>20141101</enddate><creator>Beck, Matthew J.</creator><creator>Mauldin, Elaine G.</creator><general>American Accounting Association</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20141101</creationdate><title>Who's Really in Charge? 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Audit Committee versus CFO Power and Audit Fees</atitle><jtitle>The Accounting review</jtitle><date>2014-11-01</date><risdate>2014</risdate><volume>89</volume><issue>6</issue><spage>2057</spage><epage>2085</epage><pages>2057-2085</pages><issn>0001-4826</issn><eissn>1558-7967</eissn><coden>ACRVAS</coden><abstract>Although regulation makes audit committees responsible for determining and negotiating audit fees, researchers and practitioners express concerns that CFOs continue to control these negotiations. Thus, regulation may give investors a false sense of security regarding auditor independence. We utilize the recent financial crisis and economic recession as an exogenous shock that allows us to shed light on the relative influence of the audit committee and the CFO on fee negotiations. During the recession, we find larger fee reductions in the presence of more powerful CFOs, and smaller fee reductions in the presence of more powerful audit committees. 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source | Jstor Complete Legacy; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete |
subjects | Accountant independence Audit committees Audit fees Auditing Auditing standards Audits Business audits Business risks Chief financial officers Economic recessions Fees Financial audits Financial crisis Internal audits Investors Management audits Negotiations Professional fees Recession Recessions Regulation Scandals Security Studies Tax audits |
title | Who's Really in Charge? Audit Committee versus CFO Power and Audit Fees |
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