Publicity vs. impact in nonprofit disclosures and donor preferences: a sequential game with one nonprofit organization and N donors
Charitable giving is one of the essential tasks of a properly functioning civil society. This task is greatly complicated by the lack of organizational transparency and by the information asymmetries that often exist between organizations and donors in the market for charitable donations. The disclo...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Annals of operations research 2014-10, Vol.221 (1), p.469-491 |
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| container_title | Annals of operations research |
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| creator | Zhuang, Jun Saxton, Gregory D. Wu, Han |
| description | Charitable giving is one of the essential tasks of a properly functioning civil society. This task is greatly complicated by the lack of organizational transparency and by the information asymmetries that often exist between organizations and donors in the market for charitable donations. The disclosure of financial, performance, donor-relations, and fundraising-related data is thus an important tool for nonprofit organizations attempting to attract greater donations while boosting accountability and public trust. There are, however, varying payoffs associated with such disclosure depending on the nature of donor preferences and the relative openness and effectiveness of competing organizations. To help understand the interplay between nonprofit organizational disclosures and individual donations, we present a novel game-theoretic model of disclosure–donation interactions that incorporates the predominant forms of both donor preferences and “value-relevant” information. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s10479-011-0967-3 |
| format | Article |
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This task is greatly complicated by the lack of organizational transparency and by the information asymmetries that often exist between organizations and donors in the market for charitable donations. The disclosure of financial, performance, donor-relations, and fundraising-related data is thus an important tool for nonprofit organizations attempting to attract greater donations while boosting accountability and public trust. There are, however, varying payoffs associated with such disclosure depending on the nature of donor preferences and the relative openness and effectiveness of competing organizations. 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| ispartof | Annals of operations research, 2014-10, Vol.221 (1), p.469-491 |
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| source | SpringerNature Journals; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Accountability Asymmetry Business and Management Capital markets Civil society Combinatorics Communication Disclosure Donations Earthquakes Fund raising Game theory Games Gifts Humanitarianism Management Markets National security Nonprofit organizations Operations research Operations Research/Decision Theory Organizational communication Organizations Tasks Text messaging Theory of Computation Utility functions |
| title | Publicity vs. impact in nonprofit disclosures and donor preferences: a sequential game with one nonprofit organization and N donors |
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