Implementing the “Wisdom of the Crowd”

We study a novel mechanism design model in which agents each arrive sequentially and choose one action from a set of actions with unknown rewards. The information revealed by the principal affects the incentives of the agents to explore and generate new information. We characterize the optimal discl...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Journal of political economy 2014-10, Vol.122 (5), p.988-1012
Hauptverfasser:	Kremer, Ilan, Mansour, Yishay, Perry, Motty
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	A priori knowledge Agency theory Business structures Decision making models Determinism Disclosure Economic theory Experimentation Information analysis Information management Internet Management science Mechanism design Optimal policy Political economy Recommendations Social welfare Stochastic models Studies Websites Welfare economics
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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