Institutional interactions and economic growth: the joint effects of property rights, veto players and democratic capital
We investigate the possible interaction effects that the extent of property rights protection and separation of powers in a political system have on economic growth. Using analysis of panel data from more than countries over the period 1970-2010 we find that the growth effects of property rights inc...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Public choice 2013-12, Vol.157 (3/4), p.449-474 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 474 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 3/4 |
| container_start_page | 449 |
| container_title | Public choice |
| container_volume | 157 |
| creator | Justesen, Mogens K. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter |
| description | We investigate the possible interaction effects that the extent of property rights protection and separation of powers in a political system have on economic growth. Using analysis of panel data from more than countries over the period 1970-2010 we find that the growth effects of property rights increase when political power is divided among more veto players. When distinguishing between institutional veto players (political institutions) and partisan veto players (fractionalization among political parties), we further find that the growth effects of property rights are driven mainly by checks on the chief executive (in bicameral systems) and primarily found in countries with large stocks of democratic capital. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11127-013-0143-1 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1613948784</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>24507623</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>24507623</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c544t-6f021d2ed74ca2d392e818cb5ff8a2528ed543bf382e1af3bb88d92cca25a09a3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kU9rGzEQxUVoIa6bD5BDQJBLD9lGoz-72txKaFpDIJfkLGTtyF6zXm0kOcXfPjJbSumhh2EY-L03wzxCLoF9Bcaa2wQAvKkYiFJSVHBGFqAaUTXA4ANZMCZ1pTRvz8mnlHaMMVFrtSDH1Zhynw-5D6MdaD9mjNadpkTt2FF0YQz73tFNDL_y9o7mLdJdKBxF79HlRIOnUwwTxnyksd9sc7qhb5gDnQZ7xDj7dLgPLtpcnJyd-myHz-Sjt0PCi999SV4evj_f_6wen36s7r89Vk5JmavaMw4dx66RzvJOtBw1aLdW3mvLFdfYKSnWXmiOYL1Yr7XuWu4KrCxrrViSL7NvOfL1gCmbfZ8cDoMdMRySgRpEK3WjZUGv_0F34RDLXwola6gFb6EpFMyUiyGliN5Msd_beDTAzCkMM4dhShjmFIaBouGzJhV23GD8y_k_oqtZtEs5xD9buFSsqbkQ7xHSmE0</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1461632917</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Institutional interactions and economic growth: the joint effects of property rights, veto players and democratic capital</title><source>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</source><source>EBSCOhost Business Source Complete</source><source>JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing</source><source>EBSCOhost Political Science Complete</source><source>SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings</source><creator>Justesen, Mogens K. ; Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter</creator><creatorcontrib>Justesen, Mogens K. ; Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter</creatorcontrib><description>We investigate the possible interaction effects that the extent of property rights protection and separation of powers in a political system have on economic growth. Using analysis of panel data from more than countries over the period 1970-2010 we find that the growth effects of property rights increase when political power is divided among more veto players. When distinguishing between institutional veto players (political institutions) and partisan veto players (fractionalization among political parties), we further find that the growth effects of property rights are driven mainly by checks on the chief executive (in bicameral systems) and primarily found in countries with large stocks of democratic capital. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]</description><identifier>ISSN: 0048-5829</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1573-7101</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0143-1</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Boston: Springer</publisher><subject>Capital ; Democracy ; Economic growth ; Economic growth models ; Economic theory ; Economics ; Economics and Finance ; Game theory ; Institutions ; Long run economic growth ; Organizational behaviour ; Political economy ; Political partisanship ; Political power ; Political Science ; Political science research ; Political systems ; Politics ; Private property ; Property legislation ; Property rights ; Public Finance ; Separation of powers ; Studies ; Veto ; Vetoes</subject><ispartof>Public choice, 2013-12, Vol.157 (3/4), p.449-474</ispartof><rights>2013 Springer Science+Business Media</rights><rights>Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c544t-6f021d2ed74ca2d392e818cb5ff8a2528ed543bf382e1af3bb88d92cca25a09a3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c544t-6f021d2ed74ca2d392e818cb5ff8a2528ed543bf382e1af3bb88d92cca25a09a3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/24507623$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/24507623$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,803,12845,27924,27925,41488,42557,51319,58017,58250</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Justesen, Mogens K.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter</creatorcontrib><title>Institutional interactions and economic growth: the joint effects of property rights, veto players and democratic capital</title><title>Public choice</title><addtitle>Public Choice</addtitle><description>We investigate the possible interaction effects that the extent of property rights protection and separation of powers in a political system have on economic growth. Using analysis of panel data from more than countries over the period 1970-2010 we find that the growth effects of property rights increase when political power is divided among more veto players. When distinguishing between institutional veto players (political institutions) and partisan veto players (fractionalization among political parties), we further find that the growth effects of property rights are driven mainly by checks on the chief executive (in bicameral systems) and primarily found in countries with large stocks of democratic capital. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]</description><subject>Capital</subject><subject>Democracy</subject><subject>Economic growth</subject><subject>Economic growth models</subject><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Economics</subject><subject>Economics and Finance</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Institutions</subject><subject>Long run economic growth</subject><subject>Organizational behaviour</subject><subject>Political economy</subject><subject>Political partisanship</subject><subject>Political power</subject><subject>Political Science</subject><subject>Political science research</subject><subject>Political systems</subject><subject>Politics</subject><subject>Private property</subject><subject>Property legislation</subject><subject>Property rights</subject><subject>Public Finance</subject><subject>Separation of powers</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Veto</subject><subject>Vetoes</subject><issn>0048-5829</issn><issn>1573-7101</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2013</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kU9rGzEQxUVoIa6bD5BDQJBLD9lGoz-72txKaFpDIJfkLGTtyF6zXm0kOcXfPjJbSumhh2EY-L03wzxCLoF9Bcaa2wQAvKkYiFJSVHBGFqAaUTXA4ANZMCZ1pTRvz8mnlHaMMVFrtSDH1Zhynw-5D6MdaD9mjNadpkTt2FF0YQz73tFNDL_y9o7mLdJdKBxF79HlRIOnUwwTxnyksd9sc7qhb5gDnQZ7xDj7dLgPLtpcnJyd-myHz-Sjt0PCi999SV4evj_f_6wen36s7r89Vk5JmavaMw4dx66RzvJOtBw1aLdW3mvLFdfYKSnWXmiOYL1Yr7XuWu4KrCxrrViSL7NvOfL1gCmbfZ8cDoMdMRySgRpEK3WjZUGv_0F34RDLXwola6gFb6EpFMyUiyGliN5Msd_beDTAzCkMM4dhShjmFIaBouGzJhV23GD8y_k_oqtZtEs5xD9buFSsqbkQ7xHSmE0</recordid><startdate>20131201</startdate><enddate>20131201</enddate><creator>Justesen, Mogens K.</creator><creator>Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter</creator><general>Springer</general><general>Springer US</general><general>Springer Nature B.V</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>0-V</scope><scope>0U~</scope><scope>1-H</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7UB</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>88C</scope><scope>88J</scope><scope>8AO</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8FI</scope><scope>8FJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ALSLI</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DPSOV</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>FYUFA</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>GHDGH</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>HEHIP</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>K8~</scope><scope>KC-</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>L.0</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>M0T</scope><scope>M2L</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>M2R</scope><scope>M2S</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>Q9U</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20131201</creationdate><title>Institutional interactions and economic growth: the joint effects of property rights, veto players and democratic capital</title><author>Justesen, Mogens K. ; Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c544t-6f021d2ed74ca2d392e818cb5ff8a2528ed543bf382e1af3bb88d92cca25a09a3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2013</creationdate><topic>Capital</topic><topic>Democracy</topic><topic>Economic growth</topic><topic>Economic growth models</topic><topic>Economic theory</topic><topic>Economics</topic><topic>Economics and Finance</topic><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>Institutions</topic><topic>Long run economic growth</topic><topic>Organizational behaviour</topic><topic>Political economy</topic><topic>Political partisanship</topic><topic>Political power</topic><topic>Political Science</topic><topic>Political science research</topic><topic>Political systems</topic><topic>Politics</topic><topic>Private property</topic><topic>Property legislation</topic><topic>Property rights</topic><topic>Public Finance</topic><topic>Separation of powers</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Veto</topic><topic>Vetoes</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Justesen, Mogens K.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>ProQuest Social Sciences Premium Collection</collection><collection>Global News & ABI/Inform Professional</collection><collection>Trade PRO</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><collection>Access via ABI/INFORM (ProQuest)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (PDF only)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Healthcare Administration Database (Alumni)</collection><collection>Social Science Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Pharma Collection</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Research Library (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>Social Science Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>Politics Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>Research Library Prep</collection><collection>Sociology Collection</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection</collection><collection>DELNET Management Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Politics Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Standard</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global</collection><collection>Healthcare Administration Database</collection><collection>Political Science Database</collection><collection>Research Library</collection><collection>Social Science Database</collection><collection>Sociology Database</collection><collection>Research Library (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><jtitle>Public choice</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Justesen, Mogens K.</au><au>Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Institutional interactions and economic growth: the joint effects of property rights, veto players and democratic capital</atitle><jtitle>Public choice</jtitle><stitle>Public Choice</stitle><date>2013-12-01</date><risdate>2013</risdate><volume>157</volume><issue>3/4</issue><spage>449</spage><epage>474</epage><pages>449-474</pages><issn>0048-5829</issn><eissn>1573-7101</eissn><abstract>We investigate the possible interaction effects that the extent of property rights protection and separation of powers in a political system have on economic growth. Using analysis of panel data from more than countries over the period 1970-2010 we find that the growth effects of property rights increase when political power is divided among more veto players. When distinguishing between institutional veto players (political institutions) and partisan veto players (fractionalization among political parties), we further find that the growth effects of property rights are driven mainly by checks on the chief executive (in bicameral systems) and primarily found in countries with large stocks of democratic capital. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]</abstract><cop>Boston</cop><pub>Springer</pub><doi>10.1007/s11127-013-0143-1</doi><tpages>26</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0048-5829 |
| ispartof | Public choice, 2013-12, Vol.157 (3/4), p.449-474 |
| issn | 0048-5829 1573-7101 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1613948784 |
| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; EBSCOhost Political Science Complete; SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings |
| subjects | Capital Democracy Economic growth Economic growth models Economic theory Economics Economics and Finance Game theory Institutions Long run economic growth Organizational behaviour Political economy Political partisanship Political power Political Science Political science research Political systems Politics Private property Property legislation Property rights Public Finance Separation of powers Studies Veto Vetoes |
| title | Institutional interactions and economic growth: the joint effects of property rights, veto players and democratic capital |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-23T04%3A17%3A42IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Institutional%20interactions%20and%20economic%20growth:%20the%20joint%20effects%20of%20property%20rights,%20veto%20players%20and%20democratic%20capital&rft.jtitle=Public%20choice&rft.au=Justesen,%20Mogens%20K.&rft.date=2013-12-01&rft.volume=157&rft.issue=3/4&rft.spage=449&rft.epage=474&rft.pages=449-474&rft.issn=0048-5829&rft.eissn=1573-7101&rft_id=info:doi/10.1007/s11127-013-0143-1&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E24507623%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1461632917&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=24507623&rfr_iscdi=true |