Public provision vs. outsourcing of cultural services: Evidence from Italian cities

•First investigation of the determinants of outsourcing in cultural policy•We intersect the literature on the drivers of outsourcing and cultural economics.•We use dynamic panel data analysis and consider Italian cities in 1998–2008.•Fiscal stress (asset specificity) is a positive (negative) driver...

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Veröffentlicht in:European Journal of Political Economy 2014-09, Vol.35, p.168-182
Hauptverfasser: Bertacchini, Enrico, Dalle Nogare, Chiara
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description •First investigation of the determinants of outsourcing in cultural policy•We intersect the literature on the drivers of outsourcing and cultural economics.•We use dynamic panel data analysis and consider Italian cities in 1998–2008.•Fiscal stress (asset specificity) is a positive (negative) driver of outsourcing.•Strong link to political economy, as an additional driver is the timing of election. Cultural policy often implies the transfer of public resources to cultural institutions. In this contribution we focus on the determinants of a government's choice between subsidies to external cultural organizations and in-house cultural production. We argue that the determinants of grants in the cultural field may be the same as those of outsourced services, and we make reference to the empirical literature on the drivers of public services outsourcing. We consider Italian cities' cultural policies in the 1998–2008 period, a time when overall cultural expenditure shrank while cultural transfers increased. Using dynamic panel data analysis and controlling for specific economic, fiscal, and political characteristics of each city, we find that transfers to cultural organizations are negatively affected by asset specificity and more likely to occur in cities subject to fiscal stress. The results also highlight that the timing of elections plays a role.
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source Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Access via ScienceDirect (Elsevier)
subjects Cities
Cultural organizations
Cultural policy
Elections
Grants
Italy
Local government
Outsourcing
Panel data
Production
Public cultural expenditure
Public Services
Services
Subcontracting
Subsidies
title Public provision vs. outsourcing of cultural services: Evidence from Italian cities
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