Taking, giving, and impure altruism in dictator games

We show that, if giving is equivalent to not taking, impure altruism could account for List’s (in Journal of Political Economy 115(3):482–493, 2007 ) finding that the payoff to recipients in a dictator game decreases when the dictator has the option to take. We examine behavior in dictator games wit...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association 2014-09, Vol.17 (3), p.488-500
Hauptverfasser:	Korenok, Oleg, Millner, Edward L., Razzolini, Laura
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Altruism Behavioral/Experimental Economics Data analysis Dictators Economic models Economic statistics Economic theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Endowment Experimental economics Experiments Game Theory Games Hypothesis Microeconomics Operations Research/Decision Theory Original Paper Pay-off Political economy Preferences Social and Behav. Sciences Studies Utility functions Violations
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