Ties that count: explaining interest group access to policymakers
The degree to which interest groups gain access to policymakers has often been explained by focusing on the exchange of resources in a dyadic relation between interest groups and policymakers. This article argues that the position an interest group occupies within a coalition and the relations it ha...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of public policy 2014-04, Vol.34 (1), p.93-121 |
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| container_title | Journal of public policy |
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| creator | Beyers, Jan Braun, Caelesta |
| description | The degree to which interest groups gain access to policymakers has often been explained by focusing on the exchange of resources in a dyadic relation between interest groups and policymakers. This article argues that the position an interest group occupies within a coalition and the relations it has outside its coalition substantially affect the likelihood of gaining access to policymakers. Our empirical focus is on the Dutch interest group system for which we examine how coalitions among groups and the network position of interest groups within and between such coalitions shape access. The analysis, based on data collected among 107 Dutch interest groups and 28 policymakers, leads to the conclusion that network positions count differently for elected and non-elected officials, and that network ties that bridge different coalitions add significant explanatory leverage to resource-based explanations of access. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/S0143814X13000263 |
| format | Article |
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Pub. Pol</addtitle><date>2014-04</date><risdate>2014</risdate><volume>34</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>93</spage><epage>121</epage><pages>93-121</pages><issn>0143-814X</issn><eissn>1469-7815</eissn><coden>JPUPDE</coden><abstract>The degree to which interest groups gain access to policymakers has often been explained by focusing on the exchange of resources in a dyadic relation between interest groups and policymakers. This article argues that the position an interest group occupies within a coalition and the relations it has outside its coalition substantially affect the likelihood of gaining access to policymakers. Our empirical focus is on the Dutch interest group system for which we examine how coalitions among groups and the network position of interest groups within and between such coalitions shape access. The analysis, based on data collected among 107 Dutch interest groups and 28 policymakers, leads to the conclusion that network positions count differently for elected and non-elected officials, and that network ties that bridge different coalitions add significant explanatory leverage to resource-based explanations of access.</abstract><cop>Cambridge, UK</cop><pub>Cambridge University Press</pub><doi>10.1017/S0143814X13000263</doi><tpages>29</tpages></addata></record> |
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| source | PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Cambridge Journals Online; JSTOR |
| subjects | Brokerages Bureaucracy Coalitions Computer Networks Decision-making Elected officials Endowment European Union Focus groups Government officials Interest Groups Labor unions Legislators Lobbying Netherlands Network Analysis Networks Nongovernmental organizations Policy making Political interest groups Politicians Politics Public officials Public policy |
| title | Ties that count: explaining interest group access to policymakers |
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