Vertically Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly with Quality-dependent Fixed Costs
The paper studies duopolistic competition when firms face fixed quality‐dependent costs of production and one of the two firms targets (at least in the long run) welfare maximization. We show that mixed oligopoly is in general socially desirable compared with a private duopoly regardless of the type...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | The Manchester school 2014-09, Vol.82 (5), p.596-619 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 619 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 5 |
| container_start_page | 596 |
| container_title | The Manchester school |
| container_volume | 82 |
| creator | Lutz, Stefan Pezzino, Mario |
| description | The paper studies duopolistic competition when firms face fixed quality‐dependent costs of production and one of the two firms targets (at least in the long run) welfare maximization. We show that mixed oligopoly is in general socially desirable compared with a private duopoly regardless of the type of competition in the short run and the equilibrium quality ranking. In addition, the nationalization of one of the firms seems to be a more efficient regulatory instrument than the adoption of minimum quality standard or subsidization of the high‐quality provider. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/manc.12035 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1559013642</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>1559013642</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c4695-8a4d8c07bfb3805f26ceca454088d30c0819b76fa94d92551043527308b279143</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp90MlOwzAQBuAIgUQpXHiCSlwQUoodb8mxBFpAXYRYys1yHAdc0iTYrtq-PW4LHDjggz2Sv380miA4haAL_bmci0p2YQQQ2QtaEFMWJglh-9sahZTF9DA4snYGAGCURq1g-KKM01KU5bpzrYtCGVU5LZzKOyO98vek1G91U_vvpXbvnYeFKLVbh7lqVJV72-lvWVpbZ4-Dg0KUVp18v-3guX_zlN6Gw8ngLu0NQ4lpQsJY4DyWgGVFhmJAiohKJQUmGMRxjoAEMUwyRguR4DyJCIEAIxIxBOIsYgnEqB2c7_o2pv5cKOv4XFupylJUql5YDglJAEQUR56e_aGzemEqP91GIUYQjqhXFzslTW2tUQVvjJ4Ls-YQ8M1i-WaxfLtYj-EOL3Wp1v9IPuqN059MuMto69TqNyPMB6fMT8Gn4wG_n1J69eiLV_QFvT6IVw</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1553753426</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Vertically Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly with Quality-dependent Fixed Costs</title><source>Wiley Online Library</source><source>Business Source Complete</source><creator>Lutz, Stefan ; Pezzino, Mario</creator><creatorcontrib>Lutz, Stefan ; Pezzino, Mario</creatorcontrib><description>The paper studies duopolistic competition when firms face fixed quality‐dependent costs of production and one of the two firms targets (at least in the long run) welfare maximization. We show that mixed oligopoly is in general socially desirable compared with a private duopoly regardless of the type of competition in the short run and the equilibrium quality ranking. In addition, the nationalization of one of the firms seems to be a more efficient regulatory instrument than the adoption of minimum quality standard or subsidization of the high‐quality provider.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1463-6786</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1467-9957</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1111/manc.12035</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Manchester: Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><subject>Comparative analysis ; Duopolistic competition ; Duopoly ; Economic analysis ; Economic equilibrium ; Fixed costs ; Nationalization ; Oligopoly ; Studies ; Welfare economics</subject><ispartof>The Manchester school, 2014-09, Vol.82 (5), p.596-619</ispartof><rights>2013 The University of Manchester and John Wiley & Sons Ltd</rights><rights>Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Sep 2014</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c4695-8a4d8c07bfb3805f26ceca454088d30c0819b76fa94d92551043527308b279143</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c4695-8a4d8c07bfb3805f26ceca454088d30c0819b76fa94d92551043527308b279143</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111%2Fmanc.12035$$EPDF$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111%2Fmanc.12035$$EHTML$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,1411,27901,27902,45550,45551</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Lutz, Stefan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Pezzino, Mario</creatorcontrib><title>Vertically Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly with Quality-dependent Fixed Costs</title><title>The Manchester school</title><addtitle>The Manchester School</addtitle><description>The paper studies duopolistic competition when firms face fixed quality‐dependent costs of production and one of the two firms targets (at least in the long run) welfare maximization. We show that mixed oligopoly is in general socially desirable compared with a private duopoly regardless of the type of competition in the short run and the equilibrium quality ranking. In addition, the nationalization of one of the firms seems to be a more efficient regulatory instrument than the adoption of minimum quality standard or subsidization of the high‐quality provider.</description><subject>Comparative analysis</subject><subject>Duopolistic competition</subject><subject>Duopoly</subject><subject>Economic analysis</subject><subject>Economic equilibrium</subject><subject>Fixed costs</subject><subject>Nationalization</subject><subject>Oligopoly</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Welfare economics</subject><issn>1463-6786</issn><issn>1467-9957</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2014</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp90MlOwzAQBuAIgUQpXHiCSlwQUoodb8mxBFpAXYRYys1yHAdc0iTYrtq-PW4LHDjggz2Sv380miA4haAL_bmci0p2YQQQ2QtaEFMWJglh-9sahZTF9DA4snYGAGCURq1g-KKM01KU5bpzrYtCGVU5LZzKOyO98vek1G91U_vvpXbvnYeFKLVbh7lqVJV72-lvWVpbZ4-Dg0KUVp18v-3guX_zlN6Gw8ngLu0NQ4lpQsJY4DyWgGVFhmJAiohKJQUmGMRxjoAEMUwyRguR4DyJCIEAIxIxBOIsYgnEqB2c7_o2pv5cKOv4XFupylJUql5YDglJAEQUR56e_aGzemEqP91GIUYQjqhXFzslTW2tUQVvjJ4Ls-YQ8M1i-WaxfLtYj-EOL3Wp1v9IPuqN059MuMto69TqNyPMB6fMT8Gn4wG_n1J69eiLV_QFvT6IVw</recordid><startdate>201409</startdate><enddate>201409</enddate><creator>Lutz, Stefan</creator><creator>Pezzino, Mario</creator><general>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</general><scope>BSCLL</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>201409</creationdate><title>Vertically Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly with Quality-dependent Fixed Costs</title><author>Lutz, Stefan ; Pezzino, Mario</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c4695-8a4d8c07bfb3805f26ceca454088d30c0819b76fa94d92551043527308b279143</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2014</creationdate><topic>Comparative analysis</topic><topic>Duopolistic competition</topic><topic>Duopoly</topic><topic>Economic analysis</topic><topic>Economic equilibrium</topic><topic>Fixed costs</topic><topic>Nationalization</topic><topic>Oligopoly</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Welfare economics</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Lutz, Stefan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Pezzino, Mario</creatorcontrib><collection>Istex</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>The Manchester school</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Lutz, Stefan</au><au>Pezzino, Mario</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Vertically Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly with Quality-dependent Fixed Costs</atitle><jtitle>The Manchester school</jtitle><addtitle>The Manchester School</addtitle><date>2014-09</date><risdate>2014</risdate><volume>82</volume><issue>5</issue><spage>596</spage><epage>619</epage><pages>596-619</pages><issn>1463-6786</issn><eissn>1467-9957</eissn><abstract>The paper studies duopolistic competition when firms face fixed quality‐dependent costs of production and one of the two firms targets (at least in the long run) welfare maximization. We show that mixed oligopoly is in general socially desirable compared with a private duopoly regardless of the type of competition in the short run and the equilibrium quality ranking. In addition, the nationalization of one of the firms seems to be a more efficient regulatory instrument than the adoption of minimum quality standard or subsidization of the high‐quality provider.</abstract><cop>Manchester</cop><pub>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</pub><doi>10.1111/manc.12035</doi><tpages>24</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 1463-6786 |
| ispartof | The Manchester school, 2014-09, Vol.82 (5), p.596-619 |
| issn | 1463-6786 1467-9957 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1559013642 |
| source | Wiley Online Library; Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Comparative analysis Duopolistic competition Duopoly Economic analysis Economic equilibrium Fixed costs Nationalization Oligopoly Studies Welfare economics |
| title | Vertically Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly with Quality-dependent Fixed Costs |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-02-14T15%3A20%3A28IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Vertically%20Differentiated%20Mixed%20Oligopoly%20with%20Quality-dependent%20Fixed%20Costs&rft.jtitle=The%20Manchester%20school&rft.au=Lutz,%20Stefan&rft.date=2014-09&rft.volume=82&rft.issue=5&rft.spage=596&rft.epage=619&rft.pages=596-619&rft.issn=1463-6786&rft.eissn=1467-9957&rft_id=info:doi/10.1111/manc.12035&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E1559013642%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1553753426&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true |