Partisan Bias and Information Discounting in Economic Judgments

Research shows that partisanship biases people's views about the economy. Yet, there is little understanding of the factors, if any, that might mitigate the influence of partisanship on these judgments or the effect of partisanship on metacognitive judgments. This study uses an experimental des...

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Veröffentlicht in:Political psychology 2014-06, Vol.35 (3), p.401-415
Hauptverfasser: Ramirez, Mark D., Erickson, Nathan
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container_title Political psychology
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Erickson, Nathan
description Research shows that partisanship biases people's views about the economy. Yet, there is little understanding of the factors, if any, that might mitigate the influence of partisanship on these judgments or the effect of partisanship on metacognitive judgments. This study uses an experimental design to show that partisanship continues to bias economic judgments even when subjects receive direct and neutral information about specific aspects of the economy. Moreover, it extends our understanding of partisan bias by showing it has a direct effect on people's metacognitive assessments of their own attitudes—particularly the degree of uncertainty people have in their own economic judgments. However, it appears that people are aware of the conflict between their partisan-based judgment and economic information since we observe increases in economic uncertainty when information is counter to a subject's partisan predisposition. The results provide new insight into the extent of partisan bias and the difficulty of countering partisan-based judgments.
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source Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; Political Science Complete; Wiley Online Library All Journals
subjects Attitudes
Bias
Conflict
Control groups
economic attitudes
Economic conditions
Economic research
Economic uncertainty
Economics
Evaluation
Experiment design
heuristics
Ideology
Information
Judgement
Judgment
Metacognition
misperceptions
Neutralism
partisan bias
Partisanship
Political attitudes
Political behavior
Political parties
Political partisanship
Political theory
Positive economics
Unemployment
title Partisan Bias and Information Discounting in Economic Judgments
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