Rights Offerings and Expropriation by Controlling Shareholders

We investigate rights issues and open offers in Hong Kong. We observe that the greater the severity of firms’ management‐agency problems, the more unfavourably shareholders tend to react, leading to more negative cumulative abnormal returns or rights forfeiture. Controlling shareholders do not forfe...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of business finance & accounting 2014-06, Vol.41 (5-6), p.773-790
Hauptverfasser:	Fong, Wai-Ming, Lam, Kevin C.K.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Abnormal returns Accounting corporate governance Discounts event study Financial analysis Hong Kong open offers Ownership Prices Rights rights issues Stock offerings Stockholders Studies Underwriting
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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