Verifying payoff security in the mixed extension of discontinuous games

We introduce the concept of disjoint payoff matching which can be used to show that the mixed extension of a compact game is payoff secure. By putting minor structure on the discontinuities, we need only check payoffs at each strategy rather than in neighborhoods of each strategy profile, placing mi...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of economic theory 2014-07, Vol.152, p.291-303
Hauptverfasser:	Allison, Blake A., Lepore, Jason J.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Discontinuous games Disjoint payoff matching Economic models Economic theory Equilibrium Existence Game theory Nash equilibrium Oligopoly Pay-off Structural change Studies
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container_title	Journal of economic theory
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creator	Allison, Blake A. Lepore, Jason J.
description	We introduce the concept of disjoint payoff matching which can be used to show that the mixed extension of a compact game is payoff secure. By putting minor structure on the discontinuities, we need only check payoffs at each strategy rather than in neighborhoods of each strategy profile, placing minimal restriction on the payoffs at points of discontinuity. The results are used to verify existence of equilibrium in a general model of Bertrand–Edgeworth oligopoly.
doi_str_mv	10.1016/j.jet.2014.05.003
format	Article
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The results are used to verify existence of equilibrium in a general model of Bertrand–Edgeworth oligopoly.</description><subject>Discontinuous games</subject><subject>Disjoint payoff matching</subject><subject>Economic models</subject><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Equilibrium</subject><subject>Existence</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Nash equilibrium</subject><subject>Oligopoly</subject><subject>Pay-off</subject><subject>Structural change</subject><subject>Studies</subject><issn>0022-0531</issn><issn>1095-7235</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2014</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp9kE1LAzEQhoMoWD9-gLeAFy-7TpLNtosnKVqFghf1GmJ2UrO0SU12pfvvTaknD54Ghucd3nkIuWJQMmD1bVd22JccWFWCLAHEEZkwaGQx5UIekwkA5wVIwU7JWUodAGOyridk8Y7R2dH5Fd3qMVhLE5ohun6kztP-E-nG7bCluOvRJxc8DZa2Lpnge-eHMCS60htMF-TE6nXCy995Tt4eH17nT8XyZfE8v18WpuK8L4QVYtpow2xl9LQ2kpu2Rc7ayjDdaC7rKeTVbMYReV1raI0Q2Aj40FJYBuKc3BzubmP4GjD1apPL4HqtPeYyiknJZVMB36PXf9AuDNHndpkSjagY8CZT7ECZGFKKaNU2uo2Oo2Kg9mpVp7JatVerQKqsNmfuDhnMn347jCoZh95g6yKaXrXB_ZP-Ae9KgQg</recordid><startdate>20140701</startdate><enddate>20140701</enddate><creator>Allison, Blake A.</creator><creator>Lepore, Jason J.</creator><general>Elsevier Inc</general><general>Elsevier Science Publishing Company, Inc</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20140701</creationdate><title>Verifying payoff security in the mixed extension of discontinuous games</title><author>Allison, Blake A. ; Lepore, Jason J.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c422t-3f3379ac1f4ca76c52cdde21d4c1a9a256702cd882ee266a0dc33e930ba53f103</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2014</creationdate><topic>Discontinuous games</topic><topic>Disjoint payoff matching</topic><topic>Economic models</topic><topic>Economic theory</topic><topic>Equilibrium</topic><topic>Existence</topic><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>Nash equilibrium</topic><topic>Oligopoly</topic><topic>Pay-off</topic><topic>Structural change</topic><topic>Studies</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Allison, Blake A.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Lepore, Jason J.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Journal of economic theory</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Allison, Blake A.</au><au>Lepore, Jason J.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Verifying payoff security in the mixed extension of discontinuous games</atitle><jtitle>Journal of economic theory</jtitle><date>2014-07-01</date><risdate>2014</risdate><volume>152</volume><spage>291</spage><epage>303</epage><pages>291-303</pages><issn>0022-0531</issn><eissn>1095-7235</eissn><coden>JECTAQ</coden><abstract>We introduce the concept of disjoint payoff matching which can be used to show that the mixed extension of a compact game is payoff secure. 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source	ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present)
subjects	Discontinuous games Disjoint payoff matching Economic models Economic theory Equilibrium Existence Game theory Nash equilibrium Oligopoly Pay-off Structural change Studies
title	Verifying payoff security in the mixed extension of discontinuous games
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