Incentives and group identity

This paper investigates in a principal–agent environment whether and how group membership influences the effectiveness of incentives and when incentives can have “hidden costs”, i.e., a detrimental effect. We show experimentally that in all interactions control mechanisms can have hidden costs for r...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Games and economic behavior 2014-07, Vol.86, p.12-25
Hauptverfasser:	Masella, Paolo, Meier, Stephan, Zahn, Philipp
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Agency theory Control theory Crowding out Economic incentives Economic psychology Economic theory Experiment Group dynamics Group membership Incentives Motivation Organizational behavior Organizational behaviour Principal-agent theory Psychological aspects Social identity Social preferences Studies Trust
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