Unconventional optimal open market purchases

We build a model in which verifiability of private debt and a timing mismatch in debt settlements can lead to a liquidity problem in the financial market. The central bank can respond to the liquidity problem by adopting an unconventional monetary policy that purchases private debts in the open mark...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Review of economic dynamics 2014-07, Vol.17 (3), p.543-558
Hauptverfasser: Gu, Chao, Haslag, Joseph H.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page 558
container_issue 3
container_start_page 543
container_title Review of economic dynamics
container_volume 17
creator Gu, Chao
Haslag, Joseph H.
description We build a model in which verifiability of private debt and a timing mismatch in debt settlements can lead to a liquidity problem in the financial market. The central bank can respond to the liquidity problem by adopting an unconventional monetary policy that purchases private debts in the open market. This policy is effective if the timing mismatch is nominal (i.e., a settlement participation risk). It is ineffective if the limited participation is driven by a real shock (i.e., preference shock).
doi_str_mv 10.1016/j.red.2013.08.004
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1552593892</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><els_id>S109420251300046X</els_id><sourcerecordid>1552593892</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c422t-7bdc16b58c651200dce89d8c923e482451a5549bfb3262189ad82f7132b420473</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kD1PwzAYhC0EEiXwA9gqsTCQ8NqxHVtMCPElVWKhs5U4b0RCGgc7qcS_x22ZGJjuhruT7iHkkkJGgcrbLvNYZwxonoHKAPgRWVDQMpWg9fHe85QBE6fkLIQOgFIJckFu1oN1wxaHqXVD2S_dOLWbveKw3JT-E6flOHv7UQYM5-SkKfuAF7-akPXT4_vDS7p6e359uF-lljM2pUVVWyoroawUlAHUFpWuldUsR64YF7QUguuqqXImGVW6rBVrCpqzijPgRZ6Q68Pu6N3XjGEymzZY7PtyQDcHQ4VgQucqDibk6k-0c7OPT3apXAtVyDicEHpIWe9C8NiY0ceb_ttQMDt-pjORn9nxM6BM5Bc7d4cOxqfbFr0JtsXBYt16tJOpXftP-weEM3XL</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1539587671</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Unconventional optimal open market purchases</title><source>Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals</source><creator>Gu, Chao ; Haslag, Joseph H.</creator><creatorcontrib>Gu, Chao ; Haslag, Joseph H.</creatorcontrib><description>We build a model in which verifiability of private debt and a timing mismatch in debt settlements can lead to a liquidity problem in the financial market. The central bank can respond to the liquidity problem by adopting an unconventional monetary policy that purchases private debts in the open market. This policy is effective if the timing mismatch is nominal (i.e., a settlement participation risk). It is ineffective if the limited participation is driven by a real shock (i.e., preference shock).</description><identifier>ISSN: 1094-2025</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1096-6099</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2013.08.004</identifier><identifier>CODEN: REDEB7</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Orlando: Elsevier Inc</publisher><subject>Capital market ; Central banks ; Consumption shock ; Debt ; Leveraging ; Liquidity ; Liquidity problem ; Liquidity shock ; Monetary policy ; Nominal scales ; Open market operations ; Securities markets ; Settlement risk ; Studies ; Timing issues ; Timing mismatch ; Unconventional monetary policy</subject><ispartof>Review of economic dynamics, 2014-07, Vol.17 (3), p.543-558</ispartof><rights>2013 Elsevier Inc.</rights><rights>Copyright Academic Press Jul 2014</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c422t-7bdc16b58c651200dce89d8c923e482451a5549bfb3262189ad82f7132b420473</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c422t-7bdc16b58c651200dce89d8c923e482451a5549bfb3262189ad82f7132b420473</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S109420251300046X$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,3537,27901,27902,65306</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Gu, Chao</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Haslag, Joseph H.</creatorcontrib><title>Unconventional optimal open market purchases</title><title>Review of economic dynamics</title><description>We build a model in which verifiability of private debt and a timing mismatch in debt settlements can lead to a liquidity problem in the financial market. The central bank can respond to the liquidity problem by adopting an unconventional monetary policy that purchases private debts in the open market. This policy is effective if the timing mismatch is nominal (i.e., a settlement participation risk). It is ineffective if the limited participation is driven by a real shock (i.e., preference shock).</description><subject>Capital market</subject><subject>Central banks</subject><subject>Consumption shock</subject><subject>Debt</subject><subject>Leveraging</subject><subject>Liquidity</subject><subject>Liquidity problem</subject><subject>Liquidity shock</subject><subject>Monetary policy</subject><subject>Nominal scales</subject><subject>Open market operations</subject><subject>Securities markets</subject><subject>Settlement risk</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Timing issues</subject><subject>Timing mismatch</subject><subject>Unconventional monetary policy</subject><issn>1094-2025</issn><issn>1096-6099</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2014</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp9kD1PwzAYhC0EEiXwA9gqsTCQ8NqxHVtMCPElVWKhs5U4b0RCGgc7qcS_x22ZGJjuhruT7iHkkkJGgcrbLvNYZwxonoHKAPgRWVDQMpWg9fHe85QBE6fkLIQOgFIJckFu1oN1wxaHqXVD2S_dOLWbveKw3JT-E6flOHv7UQYM5-SkKfuAF7-akPXT4_vDS7p6e359uF-lljM2pUVVWyoroawUlAHUFpWuldUsR64YF7QUguuqqXImGVW6rBVrCpqzijPgRZ6Q68Pu6N3XjGEymzZY7PtyQDcHQ4VgQucqDibk6k-0c7OPT3apXAtVyDicEHpIWe9C8NiY0ceb_ttQMDt-pjORn9nxM6BM5Bc7d4cOxqfbFr0JtsXBYt16tJOpXftP-weEM3XL</recordid><startdate>20140701</startdate><enddate>20140701</enddate><creator>Gu, Chao</creator><creator>Haslag, Joseph H.</creator><general>Elsevier Inc</general><general>Academic Press</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20140701</creationdate><title>Unconventional optimal open market purchases</title><author>Gu, Chao ; Haslag, Joseph H.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c422t-7bdc16b58c651200dce89d8c923e482451a5549bfb3262189ad82f7132b420473</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2014</creationdate><topic>Capital market</topic><topic>Central banks</topic><topic>Consumption shock</topic><topic>Debt</topic><topic>Leveraging</topic><topic>Liquidity</topic><topic>Liquidity problem</topic><topic>Liquidity shock</topic><topic>Monetary policy</topic><topic>Nominal scales</topic><topic>Open market operations</topic><topic>Securities markets</topic><topic>Settlement risk</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Timing issues</topic><topic>Timing mismatch</topic><topic>Unconventional monetary policy</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Gu, Chao</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Haslag, Joseph H.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Review of economic dynamics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Gu, Chao</au><au>Haslag, Joseph H.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Unconventional optimal open market purchases</atitle><jtitle>Review of economic dynamics</jtitle><date>2014-07-01</date><risdate>2014</risdate><volume>17</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>543</spage><epage>558</epage><pages>543-558</pages><issn>1094-2025</issn><eissn>1096-6099</eissn><coden>REDEB7</coden><abstract>We build a model in which verifiability of private debt and a timing mismatch in debt settlements can lead to a liquidity problem in the financial market. The central bank can respond to the liquidity problem by adopting an unconventional monetary policy that purchases private debts in the open market. This policy is effective if the timing mismatch is nominal (i.e., a settlement participation risk). It is ineffective if the limited participation is driven by a real shock (i.e., preference shock).</abstract><cop>Orlando</cop><pub>Elsevier Inc</pub><doi>10.1016/j.red.2013.08.004</doi><tpages>16</tpages></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 1094-2025
ispartof Review of economic dynamics, 2014-07, Vol.17 (3), p.543-558
issn 1094-2025
1096-6099
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1552593892
source Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals
subjects Capital market
Central banks
Consumption shock
Debt
Leveraging
Liquidity
Liquidity problem
Liquidity shock
Monetary policy
Nominal scales
Open market operations
Securities markets
Settlement risk
Studies
Timing issues
Timing mismatch
Unconventional monetary policy
title Unconventional optimal open market purchases
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-31T09%3A17%3A29IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Unconventional%20optimal%20open%20market%20purchases&rft.jtitle=Review%20of%20economic%20dynamics&rft.au=Gu,%20Chao&rft.date=2014-07-01&rft.volume=17&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=543&rft.epage=558&rft.pages=543-558&rft.issn=1094-2025&rft.eissn=1096-6099&rft.coden=REDEB7&rft_id=info:doi/10.1016/j.red.2013.08.004&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E1552593892%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1539587671&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_els_id=S109420251300046X&rfr_iscdi=true