Two-party competition with persistent policies

When campaigning for reelection, incumbent parties' promises to voters are constrained by their records in office, while opposition parties can use their time away from power to develop new platforms. In this paper, I introduce incumbent policy persistence in a dynamic game of electoral competi...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of economic theory 2014-07, Vol.152, p.64-91
1. Verfasser:	Forand, Jean Guillaume
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Competition Dynamic electoral competition Economic theory Elections Equilibrium Markov analysis Markov perfect equilibrium Markovian processes Policy convergence Policy persistence Political parties Political power Studies Voters
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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