A computational general equilibrium approach to sectoral analysis for tax potential: An application to Pakistan
•This study develops a dynamic general equilibrium model, applied to Pakistani data.•Optimizing agents evade taxes by operating in the underground economy.•The optimal rate of taxation, from a macroeconomic point of view, may lead to some underground activity.•Certain sectors are currently paying ta...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of Asian economics 2013-08, Vol.27, p.57-70 |
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description | •This study develops a dynamic general equilibrium model, applied to Pakistani data.•Optimizing agents evade taxes by operating in the underground economy.•The optimal rate of taxation, from a macroeconomic point of view, may lead to some underground activity.•Certain sectors are currently paying taxes below their potential, while others may be above their tax potential.•The sectoral gap estimates may be used as indicators of where greater tax enforcement efforts should be directed.
This study develops a dynamic general equilibrium model, applied to Pakistani data, in which optimizing agents evade taxes by operating in the underground economy. The cost to firms of evading taxes is that they find themselves subject to credit rationing from banks. Our model simulations show that in the absence of budgetary flexibility to adjust expenditures, raising tax rates too high drives firms into the underground economy, thereby reducing the tax base. Aggregate investment in the economy is lowered because of credit rationing. Taxes that are too low eliminate the underground economy, but result in unsustainable budget and trade deficits. Thus, the optimal rate of taxation, from a macroeconomic point of view, may lead to some underground activity. We note, in particular, that incorporating a VAT without any other tax reductions greatly reduces the tax compliance of the service sector.
We have applied our model to Pakistan, and have calibrated our model to an 8 year period from 2004 to 2011. We note that it gives a reasonable approximation of Pakistani macro data. We then use a sectoral breakdown of tax data generated by the model to estimate tax gaps on a sector by sector basis. We note that certain sectors are currently paying taxes below their potential, while others may be above their tax potential. These sectoral gap estimates may be used as indicators of where greater tax enforcement efforts should be directed. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.asieco.2013.05.004 |
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This study develops a dynamic general equilibrium model, applied to Pakistani data, in which optimizing agents evade taxes by operating in the underground economy. The cost to firms of evading taxes is that they find themselves subject to credit rationing from banks. Our model simulations show that in the absence of budgetary flexibility to adjust expenditures, raising tax rates too high drives firms into the underground economy, thereby reducing the tax base. Aggregate investment in the economy is lowered because of credit rationing. Taxes that are too low eliminate the underground economy, but result in unsustainable budget and trade deficits. Thus, the optimal rate of taxation, from a macroeconomic point of view, may lead to some underground activity. We note, in particular, that incorporating a VAT without any other tax reductions greatly reduces the tax compliance of the service sector.
We have applied our model to Pakistan, and have calibrated our model to an 8 year period from 2004 to 2011. We note that it gives a reasonable approximation of Pakistani macro data. We then use a sectoral breakdown of tax data generated by the model to estimate tax gaps on a sector by sector basis. We note that certain sectors are currently paying taxes below their potential, while others may be above their tax potential. These sectoral gap estimates may be used as indicators of where greater tax enforcement efforts should be directed.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1049-0078</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1873-7927</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.asieco.2013.05.004</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Greenwich: Elsevier Inc</publisher><subject>Agency theory ; Appropriations and expenditures ; Balance of trade ; Banking ; Compliance ; Cost ; Credit ; General equilibrium ; Informal economy ; Investments ; Macroeconomics ; Pakistan ; Pakistanis ; Rationing ; Studies ; Tax evasion ; Tax gaps ; Tax rates ; Taxation ; Taxes ; Underground economy ; VAT</subject><ispartof>Journal of Asian economics, 2013-08, Vol.27, p.57-70</ispartof><rights>2013 Elsevier Inc.</rights><rights>Copyright Elsevier Science Ltd. Aug 2013</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c477t-956fc41f37cf58db3d5e69e67e96a233994f42c6c9df312da0b5eb901847bd0e3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c477t-956fc41f37cf58db3d5e69e67e96a233994f42c6c9df312da0b5eb901847bd0e3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1049007813000584$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,3536,27844,27845,27903,27904,65309</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Feltenstein, Andrew</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Cyan, Musharraf R.</creatorcontrib><title>A computational general equilibrium approach to sectoral analysis for tax potential: An application to Pakistan</title><title>Journal of Asian economics</title><description>•This study develops a dynamic general equilibrium model, applied to Pakistani data.•Optimizing agents evade taxes by operating in the underground economy.•The optimal rate of taxation, from a macroeconomic point of view, may lead to some underground activity.•Certain sectors are currently paying taxes below their potential, while others may be above their tax potential.•The sectoral gap estimates may be used as indicators of where greater tax enforcement efforts should be directed.
This study develops a dynamic general equilibrium model, applied to Pakistani data, in which optimizing agents evade taxes by operating in the underground economy. The cost to firms of evading taxes is that they find themselves subject to credit rationing from banks. Our model simulations show that in the absence of budgetary flexibility to adjust expenditures, raising tax rates too high drives firms into the underground economy, thereby reducing the tax base. Aggregate investment in the economy is lowered because of credit rationing. Taxes that are too low eliminate the underground economy, but result in unsustainable budget and trade deficits. Thus, the optimal rate of taxation, from a macroeconomic point of view, may lead to some underground activity. We note, in particular, that incorporating a VAT without any other tax reductions greatly reduces the tax compliance of the service sector.
We have applied our model to Pakistan, and have calibrated our model to an 8 year period from 2004 to 2011. We note that it gives a reasonable approximation of Pakistani macro data. We then use a sectoral breakdown of tax data generated by the model to estimate tax gaps on a sector by sector basis. We note that certain sectors are currently paying taxes below their potential, while others may be above their tax potential. These sectoral gap estimates may be used as indicators of where greater tax enforcement efforts should be directed.</description><subject>Agency theory</subject><subject>Appropriations and expenditures</subject><subject>Balance of trade</subject><subject>Banking</subject><subject>Compliance</subject><subject>Cost</subject><subject>Credit</subject><subject>General equilibrium</subject><subject>Informal economy</subject><subject>Investments</subject><subject>Macroeconomics</subject><subject>Pakistan</subject><subject>Pakistanis</subject><subject>Rationing</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Tax evasion</subject><subject>Tax gaps</subject><subject>Tax rates</subject><subject>Taxation</subject><subject>Taxes</subject><subject>Underground economy</subject><subject>VAT</subject><issn>1049-0078</issn><issn>1873-7927</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2013</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kc1u1TAQhSNEJUrLG7Cw1A2bhPFP7LiLSlcVLUiVyqKsLceZgC-5cWo7qH17HG5XLLqas_jO0cycqvpIoaFA5ed9Y5NHFxoGlDfQNgDiTXVKO8VrpZl6WzQIXQOo7l31PqU9FEmZPK3CjrhwWNZssw-znchPnDGWiY-rn3wf_XogdllisO4XyYEkdDlsgC30c_KJjCGSbJ_IEjLO2dvpkuzmzTN59y91s323v33Kdj6vTkY7JfzwMs-qHzdfHq6_1nf3t9-ud3e1E0rlWrdydIKOXLmx7YaeDy1KjVKhlpZxrrUYBXPS6WHklA0W-hZ7DbQTqh8A-Vn16ZhbNn9cMWVz8MnhNNkZw5oMbQUtIVKwgl78h-7DGst1hRKs40xCC4USR8rFkFLE0SzRH2x8NhTM1oLZm2MLZmvBQGtKC8V2dbRhOfaPx2iS8zg7HHwsnzRD8K8H_AWeDZOc</recordid><startdate>20130801</startdate><enddate>20130801</enddate><creator>Feltenstein, Andrew</creator><creator>Cyan, Musharraf R.</creator><general>Elsevier Inc</general><general>Elsevier Science Ltd</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20130801</creationdate><title>A computational general equilibrium approach to sectoral analysis for tax potential: An application to Pakistan</title><author>Feltenstein, Andrew ; Cyan, Musharraf R.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c477t-956fc41f37cf58db3d5e69e67e96a233994f42c6c9df312da0b5eb901847bd0e3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2013</creationdate><topic>Agency theory</topic><topic>Appropriations and expenditures</topic><topic>Balance of trade</topic><topic>Banking</topic><topic>Compliance</topic><topic>Cost</topic><topic>Credit</topic><topic>General equilibrium</topic><topic>Informal economy</topic><topic>Investments</topic><topic>Macroeconomics</topic><topic>Pakistan</topic><topic>Pakistanis</topic><topic>Rationing</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Tax evasion</topic><topic>Tax gaps</topic><topic>Tax rates</topic><topic>Taxation</topic><topic>Taxes</topic><topic>Underground economy</topic><topic>VAT</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Feltenstein, Andrew</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Cyan, Musharraf R.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><jtitle>Journal of Asian economics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Feltenstein, Andrew</au><au>Cyan, Musharraf R.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>A computational general equilibrium approach to sectoral analysis for tax potential: An application to Pakistan</atitle><jtitle>Journal of Asian economics</jtitle><date>2013-08-01</date><risdate>2013</risdate><volume>27</volume><spage>57</spage><epage>70</epage><pages>57-70</pages><issn>1049-0078</issn><eissn>1873-7927</eissn><abstract>•This study develops a dynamic general equilibrium model, applied to Pakistani data.•Optimizing agents evade taxes by operating in the underground economy.•The optimal rate of taxation, from a macroeconomic point of view, may lead to some underground activity.•Certain sectors are currently paying taxes below their potential, while others may be above their tax potential.•The sectoral gap estimates may be used as indicators of where greater tax enforcement efforts should be directed.
This study develops a dynamic general equilibrium model, applied to Pakistani data, in which optimizing agents evade taxes by operating in the underground economy. The cost to firms of evading taxes is that they find themselves subject to credit rationing from banks. Our model simulations show that in the absence of budgetary flexibility to adjust expenditures, raising tax rates too high drives firms into the underground economy, thereby reducing the tax base. Aggregate investment in the economy is lowered because of credit rationing. Taxes that are too low eliminate the underground economy, but result in unsustainable budget and trade deficits. Thus, the optimal rate of taxation, from a macroeconomic point of view, may lead to some underground activity. We note, in particular, that incorporating a VAT without any other tax reductions greatly reduces the tax compliance of the service sector.
We have applied our model to Pakistan, and have calibrated our model to an 8 year period from 2004 to 2011. We note that it gives a reasonable approximation of Pakistani macro data. We then use a sectoral breakdown of tax data generated by the model to estimate tax gaps on a sector by sector basis. We note that certain sectors are currently paying taxes below their potential, while others may be above their tax potential. These sectoral gap estimates may be used as indicators of where greater tax enforcement efforts should be directed.</abstract><cop>Greenwich</cop><pub>Elsevier Inc</pub><doi>10.1016/j.asieco.2013.05.004</doi><tpages>14</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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subjects | Agency theory Appropriations and expenditures Balance of trade Banking Compliance Cost Credit General equilibrium Informal economy Investments Macroeconomics Pakistan Pakistanis Rationing Studies Tax evasion Tax gaps Tax rates Taxation Taxes Underground economy VAT |
title | A computational general equilibrium approach to sectoral analysis for tax potential: An application to Pakistan |
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