Commitment and Consequences: Reneging on Cosponsorship Pledges in the U.S. House
We argue that bill cosponsorship in Congress represents an institutional arrangement that provides credibility to commitments of support. We predict that if cosponsorship fosters legislative deals, MCs will only rarely back out on their pledges to support a bill if it comes up for a floor vote, and...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Legislative studies quarterly 2013-11, Vol.38 (4), p.461-487 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 487 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 4 |
| container_start_page | 461 |
| container_title | Legislative studies quarterly |
| container_volume | 38 |
| creator | Bernhard, William Sulkin, Tracy |
| description | We argue that bill cosponsorship in Congress represents an institutional arrangement that provides credibility to commitments of support. We predict that if cosponsorship fosters legislative deals, MCs will only rarely back out on their pledges to support a bill if it comes up for a floor vote, and when they do, these choices will reflect strategic calculations. Further, legislators who violate their cosponsorship agreements will face punishment from colleagues, compromising their ability to gain support for their own bills. We explore the causes and effects of MCs' choices to renege on a pledge by voting no on a bill for which they were a cosponsor, focusing on all cosponsorship decisions in the 101st-108th Houses. The results reveal that patterns of reneging and its consequences are consistent with the idea that cosponsorship functions as a commitment mechanism. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/lsq.12024 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1531430364</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>42703816</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>42703816</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-i3214-51ed0ea33487d716f6458e32d17f0d8c553a0c7a8194044bed911f6d58df31db3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqFkMtOwzAQRS0EEqWw4AOQvGST4vEjdthBBRSp4v2Q2FihnhRD4pQ4CPh7DEVsmc2MdO4dzVxCtoGNINVeHV9HwBmXK2QAhSiyAnK-SgZM5DwrDFPrZCPGZ8ZAF4YPyMW4bRrfNxh6WgZHx22I-PqGYYZxn15hwLkPc9qGROIiwbaLT35BL2p0c4zUB9o_Ib0dXY_opH2LuEnWqrKOuPXbh-T2-OhmPMmm5yen44Np5gUHmSlAx7AUQhrtNORVLpVBwR3oijkzU0qUbKZLA4VkUj6iKwCq3CnjKgHuUQzJ7nLvomvTvbG3jY8zrOsyYLrDghIgRXpb_i-Vhc6VMYwn6d5S-u5r_LSLzjdl92mB2e90bUrX_qRrp9eXP0Ny7Cwdz7Fvuz-H5JoJA3ni2ZL72OPHHy-7F5troZW9Pzuxd-Lh8PjyUFomvgCKDYYO</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1497658802</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Commitment and Consequences: Reneging on Cosponsorship Pledges in the U.S. House</title><source>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</source><source>HeinOnline Law Journal Library</source><source>JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing</source><source>Political Science Complete</source><source>Wiley Online Library All Journals</source><creator>Bernhard, William ; Sulkin, Tracy</creator><creatorcontrib>Bernhard, William ; Sulkin, Tracy</creatorcontrib><description>We argue that bill cosponsorship in Congress represents an institutional arrangement that provides credibility to commitments of support. We predict that if cosponsorship fosters legislative deals, MCs will only rarely back out on their pledges to support a bill if it comes up for a floor vote, and when they do, these choices will reflect strategic calculations. Further, legislators who violate their cosponsorship agreements will face punishment from colleagues, compromising their ability to gain support for their own bills. We explore the causes and effects of MCs' choices to renege on a pledge by voting no on a bill for which they were a cosponsor, focusing on all cosponsorship decisions in the 101st-108th Houses. The results reveal that patterns of reneging and its consequences are consistent with the idea that cosponsorship functions as a commitment mechanism.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0362-9805</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1939-9162</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12024</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><subject>Ability ; Bills ; Congressional resolutions ; Congressional voting ; Credibility ; Decision ; Dyadics ; Forecasts ; Joint resolutions ; Legislation ; Legislative Bodies ; Legislators ; Mathematical dependent variables ; Political science ; Political support ; Punishment ; Seniority ; Standard error ; U.S.A ; Votes ; Voting</subject><ispartof>Legislative studies quarterly, 2013-11, Vol.38 (4), p.461-487</ispartof><rights>Copyright 2013 Comparative Legislative Research Center</rights><rights>2013 The Comparative Legislative Research Center of The University of Iowa</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/42703816$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/42703816$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,803,1417,27923,27924,45573,45574,58016,58249</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Bernhard, William</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Sulkin, Tracy</creatorcontrib><title>Commitment and Consequences: Reneging on Cosponsorship Pledges in the U.S. House</title><title>Legislative studies quarterly</title><addtitle>Legislative Studies Quarterly</addtitle><description>We argue that bill cosponsorship in Congress represents an institutional arrangement that provides credibility to commitments of support. We predict that if cosponsorship fosters legislative deals, MCs will only rarely back out on their pledges to support a bill if it comes up for a floor vote, and when they do, these choices will reflect strategic calculations. Further, legislators who violate their cosponsorship agreements will face punishment from colleagues, compromising their ability to gain support for their own bills. We explore the causes and effects of MCs' choices to renege on a pledge by voting no on a bill for which they were a cosponsor, focusing on all cosponsorship decisions in the 101st-108th Houses. The results reveal that patterns of reneging and its consequences are consistent with the idea that cosponsorship functions as a commitment mechanism.</description><subject>Ability</subject><subject>Bills</subject><subject>Congressional resolutions</subject><subject>Congressional voting</subject><subject>Credibility</subject><subject>Decision</subject><subject>Dyadics</subject><subject>Forecasts</subject><subject>Joint resolutions</subject><subject>Legislation</subject><subject>Legislative Bodies</subject><subject>Legislators</subject><subject>Mathematical dependent variables</subject><subject>Political science</subject><subject>Political support</subject><subject>Punishment</subject><subject>Seniority</subject><subject>Standard error</subject><subject>U.S.A</subject><subject>Votes</subject><subject>Voting</subject><issn>0362-9805</issn><issn>1939-9162</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2013</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><recordid>eNqFkMtOwzAQRS0EEqWw4AOQvGST4vEjdthBBRSp4v2Q2FihnhRD4pQ4CPh7DEVsmc2MdO4dzVxCtoGNINVeHV9HwBmXK2QAhSiyAnK-SgZM5DwrDFPrZCPGZ8ZAF4YPyMW4bRrfNxh6WgZHx22I-PqGYYZxn15hwLkPc9qGROIiwbaLT35BL2p0c4zUB9o_Ib0dXY_opH2LuEnWqrKOuPXbh-T2-OhmPMmm5yen44Np5gUHmSlAx7AUQhrtNORVLpVBwR3oijkzU0qUbKZLA4VkUj6iKwCq3CnjKgHuUQzJ7nLvomvTvbG3jY8zrOsyYLrDghIgRXpb_i-Vhc6VMYwn6d5S-u5r_LSLzjdl92mB2e90bUrX_qRrp9eXP0Ny7Cwdz7Fvuz-H5JoJA3ni2ZL72OPHHy-7F5troZW9Pzuxd-Lh8PjyUFomvgCKDYYO</recordid><startdate>201311</startdate><enddate>201311</enddate><creator>Bernhard, William</creator><creator>Sulkin, Tracy</creator><general>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</general><general>Comparative Legislative Research Center of the University of Iowa</general><scope>BSCLL</scope><scope>7UB</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>201311</creationdate><title>Commitment and Consequences: Reneging on Cosponsorship Pledges in the U.S. House</title><author>Bernhard, William ; Sulkin, Tracy</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-i3214-51ed0ea33487d716f6458e32d17f0d8c553a0c7a8194044bed911f6d58df31db3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2013</creationdate><topic>Ability</topic><topic>Bills</topic><topic>Congressional resolutions</topic><topic>Congressional voting</topic><topic>Credibility</topic><topic>Decision</topic><topic>Dyadics</topic><topic>Forecasts</topic><topic>Joint resolutions</topic><topic>Legislation</topic><topic>Legislative Bodies</topic><topic>Legislators</topic><topic>Mathematical dependent variables</topic><topic>Political science</topic><topic>Political support</topic><topic>Punishment</topic><topic>Seniority</topic><topic>Standard error</topic><topic>U.S.A</topic><topic>Votes</topic><topic>Voting</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Bernhard, William</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Sulkin, Tracy</creatorcontrib><collection>Istex</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Legislative studies quarterly</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Bernhard, William</au><au>Sulkin, Tracy</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Commitment and Consequences: Reneging on Cosponsorship Pledges in the U.S. House</atitle><jtitle>Legislative studies quarterly</jtitle><addtitle>Legislative Studies Quarterly</addtitle><date>2013-11</date><risdate>2013</risdate><volume>38</volume><issue>4</issue><spage>461</spage><epage>487</epage><pages>461-487</pages><issn>0362-9805</issn><eissn>1939-9162</eissn><abstract>We argue that bill cosponsorship in Congress represents an institutional arrangement that provides credibility to commitments of support. We predict that if cosponsorship fosters legislative deals, MCs will only rarely back out on their pledges to support a bill if it comes up for a floor vote, and when they do, these choices will reflect strategic calculations. Further, legislators who violate their cosponsorship agreements will face punishment from colleagues, compromising their ability to gain support for their own bills. We explore the causes and effects of MCs' choices to renege on a pledge by voting no on a bill for which they were a cosponsor, focusing on all cosponsorship decisions in the 101st-108th Houses. The results reveal that patterns of reneging and its consequences are consistent with the idea that cosponsorship functions as a commitment mechanism.</abstract><pub>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</pub><doi>10.1111/lsq.12024</doi><tpages>27</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0362-9805 |
| ispartof | Legislative studies quarterly, 2013-11, Vol.38 (4), p.461-487 |
| issn | 0362-9805 1939-9162 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1531430364 |
| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; HeinOnline Law Journal Library; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; Political Science Complete; Wiley Online Library All Journals |
| subjects | Ability Bills Congressional resolutions Congressional voting Credibility Decision Dyadics Forecasts Joint resolutions Legislation Legislative Bodies Legislators Mathematical dependent variables Political science Political support Punishment Seniority Standard error U.S.A Votes Voting |
| title | Commitment and Consequences: Reneging on Cosponsorship Pledges in the U.S. House |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-08T15%3A39%3A50IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Commitment%20and%20Consequences:%20Reneging%20on%20Cosponsorship%20Pledges%20in%20the%20U.S.%20House&rft.jtitle=Legislative%20studies%20quarterly&rft.au=Bernhard,%20William&rft.date=2013-11&rft.volume=38&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=461&rft.epage=487&rft.pages=461-487&rft.issn=0362-9805&rft.eissn=1939-9162&rft_id=info:doi/10.1111/lsq.12024&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E42703816%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1497658802&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=42703816&rfr_iscdi=true |