A Behavioral Model of “Muddling Through” in the Chinese Bureaucracy: The Case of Environmental Protection

How do we characterize and explain the behavioral patterns of the Chinese bureaucracy amid China’s great transformation over the past three decades? The prevailing “tournament competition” model presented in the literature emphasizes the role of incentive design to explain bureaucratic behaviors. We...

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Veröffentlicht in:The China journal (Canberra, A.C.T.) A.C.T.), 2013-08, Vol.70 (1), p.120-147
Hauptverfasser: Zhou, Xueguang, Lian, Hong, Ortolano, Leonard, Ye, Yinyu
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container_title The China journal (Canberra, A.C.T.)
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creator Zhou, Xueguang
Lian, Hong
Ortolano, Leonard
Ye, Yinyu
description How do we characterize and explain the behavioral patterns of the Chinese bureaucracy amid China’s great transformation over the past three decades? The prevailing “tournament competition” model presented in the literature emphasizes the role of incentive design to explain bureaucratic behaviors. We develop an alternative model of “muddling through”—characterized by a reactive response to multiple pressures, constant readjustments and a focus on short-term gains—to explain the behavioral patterns of China’s intermediate government agencies. We explain the underlying multiple bureaucratic logics that induce these behavioral patterns and the institutional conditions under which such behavioral patterns prevail. We illustrate the research issues, analytical concepts and theoretical arguments, using a case study of a municipal environmental protection bureau implementing the Five-Year Plan, between 2006 and 2010.
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1835-8535
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source PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Political Science Complete (EB_SDU_P3); JSTOR
subjects Behavior
Bureaucracy
Careers
Case studies
Chemical oxygen demand
China
China (People's Republic)
Chinese languages
Competition
County governments
Economic models
Environmental policy
Environmental Protection
Five year plans
Government
Government Agencies
Government bureaucracy
Government performance
Incentives
Institutionalism
Jurisdiction
Local government
Meetings
Peoples Republic of China
Performance evaluation
Political behaviour
Pollution control
Public officials
Weber, Max (1864-1920)
Zhou Li
title A Behavioral Model of “Muddling Through” in the Chinese Bureaucracy: The Case of Environmental Protection
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