Popularity, polarization, and political budget cycles

A vast literature has established that governments may abuse policy instruments in order to enhance their popularity and thus their probability of reelection, resulting in political budget cycles. Yet do popular governments have the same incentives to boost their popularity through pre-electoral exp...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Public choice 2014-06, Vol.159 (3/4), p.457-467
Hauptverfasser:	Hanusch, Marek, Magleby, Daniel B.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Budget deficits Budgeting Budgets Economic models Economic policy Economic theory Economics Economics and Finance Elections Evidence Expenditures Fiscal policy Government Government budgets Government spending Incumbents Modeling Moral hazard Moral hazard models Political business cycles Political candidates Political economy Political parties Political Science Politics Popularity Probability Public Finance Reelection Studies Voters
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