Indexing Executive Compensation Contracts

We analyze the efficiency of indexing executive pay by calibrating the standard compensation model to a large sample of U.S. CEOs. The benefits from indexing the strike price of options are small, and fully indexing all options would increase compensation costs by 50% for most firms. Indexing has se...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Review of financial studies 2013-12, Vol.26 (12), p.3182-3224
Hauptverfasser:	Dittmann, Ingolf, Maug, Ernst, Spalt, Oliver G.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Chief executive officers Compensation Compensation costs Cost efficiency Economic rent Economic theory Executive compensation Financial incentives Indexing Marginality Options contracts Risk aversion Securities prices Stock market indices Stock options Stock prices Strike prices Studies U.S.A Utility functions
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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