Regulating the Anticommons: Insights from Public-Expenditure Theory

This article offers a new interpretation of the traditional Cournot complements problem, or anticommons, by using the theory of public goods to gain a perspective on the problem. Specifically, I examine the pricing strategies and regulation of multiple monopolies that produce products which consumer...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Southern economic journal 2013-10, Vol.80 (2), p.523-539
1. Verfasser:	Van Essen, Matt
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	C72 Capital costs Collective bargaining Collusion Commercial regulation Consumers Copper D44 Economic equilibrium Economic models Economic theory Endowments Equilibrium Expenditures Game theory Government spending H41 Marginal costs Market prices Methodology Nash equilibrium Oligopoly Pareto efficiency Patent law Profits Public expenditure Public finance Public good Public goods Regulation Studies
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