Coordination in evolving networks with endogenous decay
This paper studies an evolutionary model of network formation with endogenous decay, in which agents benefit both from direct and indirect connections. In addition to forming (costly) links, agents choose actions for a coordination game that determines the level of decay of each link. We address the...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of evolutionary economics 2013-11, Vol.23 (5), p.955-1000 |
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| container_title | Journal of evolutionary economics |
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| creator | Feri, Francesco Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A. |
| description | This paper studies an evolutionary model of network formation with endogenous decay, in which agents benefit both from direct and indirect connections. In addition to forming (costly) links, agents choose actions for a coordination game that determines the level of decay of each link. We address the issues of coordination (long-run equilibrium selection) and network formation by means of stochastic stability techniques. We find that the long-run behavior of the system depends on a fine interplay of the link cost and the trade-off between efficiency and risk-dominance. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s00191-013-0313-9 |
| format | Article |
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| subjects | Conventions Economic Growth Economic models Economic statistics Economic theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Efficiency Endogenous growth Entrepreneurship Equilibrium Evolutionary economics Game theory Games Institutional/Evolutionary Economics Microeconomics Networks R & D/Technology Policy Regular Article Risk Stochastic processes Studies |
| title | Coordination in evolving networks with endogenous decay |
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