Preemptive strike: An experimental study of fear-based aggression

The mere presence of a potential threat of attack was found to be sufficient to lead a significant proportion of participants to engage in preemptive attacks toward potential threats; this response occurred even without an incentive for either party to attack the other. We developed a new experiment...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of experimental social psychology 2013-11, Vol.49 (6), p.1120-1123
Hauptverfasser: Simunovic, Dora, Mifune, Nobuhiro, Yamagishi, Toshio
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:The mere presence of a potential threat of attack was found to be sufficient to lead a significant proportion of participants to engage in preemptive attacks toward potential threats; this response occurred even without an incentive for either party to attack the other. We developed a new experimental game—the preemptive strike game (PSG)—to demonstrate this tendency for defensive aggression. We also found that the rate at which participants attacked an individual representing a potential threat was not influenced by their minimal group membership; participants were no less likely to preemptively attack a member of their own minimal group and no more likely to use aggression against members of another minimal group. These findings indicate a need to further examine the role that fear-based defensive aggression, rather than anger-based spiteful aggression, plays in inter-individual and inter-group conflict. •We found that 50% of the participants chose to use the preemptive attack option for no personal gain.•The option was rarely used when the opponent did not have a capability of preemptive attack.•Thus, the preemptive attack was fear-based, not involving the goal of hurting the opponent.•The frequency of the option use was not affected by the minimal group membership of the opponent.
ISSN:0022-1031
1096-0465
DOI:10.1016/j.jesp.2013.08.003