Public employees lining up at the polls—the conditional effect of living and working in the same municipality

Do public employees vote more frequently than private employees? The turnout of public employees has been of central interest to public choice scholars for almost a century. Utilizing a government records dataset that is not subject to over-reporting and differential social desirability bias, we fin...

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Veröffentlicht in:Public choice 2013-09, Vol.156 (3/4), p.611-629
Hauptverfasser: Bhatti, Yosef, Hansen, Kasper M.
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description Do public employees vote more frequently than private employees? The turnout of public employees has been of central interest to public choice scholars for almost a century. Utilizing a government records dataset that is not subject to over-reporting and differential social desirability bias, we find that public employees voted 11-12 percentage points more than their counterparts in the private sector. In a multivariate analysis, however, the effect is only four to five percentage points greater for local government public employees, which is in the lower range of previous studies. We are able to distinguish between local government and central government employees and show that the latter vote two percentage points less than the former. Controlling for the specific type of educational background does not explain the public-private turnout differential. Finally, the effect of working and voting in the same municipality is larger for local government employees than other citizens. This is in accordance with their greater incentives as they elect their future employer, though the effect size is surprisingly small.
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The turnout of public employees has been of central interest to public choice scholars for almost a century. Utilizing a government records dataset that is not subject to over-reporting and differential social desirability bias, we find that public employees voted 11-12 percentage points more than their counterparts in the private sector. In a multivariate analysis, however, the effect is only four to five percentage points greater for local government public employees, which is in the lower range of previous studies. We are able to distinguish between local government and central government employees and show that the latter vote two percentage points less than the former. Controlling for the specific type of educational background does not explain the public-private turnout differential. Finally, the effect of working and voting in the same municipality is larger for local government employees than other citizens. 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source Jstor Complete Legacy; Political Science Complete; SpringerLink Journals; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Business Source Complete
subjects Bureaucrats
Central Government
Children
Citizens
Citizenship
Civil Service
Economic models
Economic statistics
Economic theory
Economics
Economics and Finance
Election results
Elections
Electorate
Employees
Employers
Employment
Employment statistics
Government employees
Incentives
Local elections
Local Government
Multivariate Analysis
Municipal employees
Municipalities
Political economy
Political Science
Private sector
Public Choice
Public Finance
Public sector
Studies
Variables
Voter behavior
Voter registration
Voter turnout
Voting
Voting turnout
title Public employees lining up at the polls—the conditional effect of living and working in the same municipality
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