Greasing the wheels? The impact of regulations and corruption on firm entry
This paper investigates the question of whether corruption might 'grease the wheels' of an economy. We investigate whether and to what extent the impact of regulations on entrepreneurship is dependent on corruption. We first test whether regulations robustly deter firm entry into markets....
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Public choice 2013-06, Vol.155 (3/4), p.413-432 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 432 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 3/4 |
| container_start_page | 413 |
| container_title | Public choice |
| container_volume | 155 |
| creator | Dreher, Axel Gassebner, Martin |
| description | This paper investigates the question of whether corruption might 'grease the wheels' of an economy. We investigate whether and to what extent the impact of regulations on entrepreneurship is dependent on corruption. We first test whether regulations robustly deter firm entry into markets. Our results show that the existence of a larger number of procedures required to start a business, as well as larger minimum capital requirements are detrimental to entrepreneurship. Second, we test whether corruption reduces the negative impact of regulations on entrepreneurship in highly regulated economies. Our empirical analysis, covering a maximum of 43 countries over the 2003-2005 period, shows that corruption facilitates firm entry in highly regulated economies. For example, the 'greasing' effect of corruption kicks in at around 50 days required to start a new business. Our results thus provide support for the 'grease the wheels' hypothesis. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11127-011-9871-2 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1448772317</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>42003108</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>42003108</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c643t-ff5c346691d31bb52af51320d9fdda18f9f4abcd56be7f61816f99a3d84fce7e3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqNkktLxDAUhYMoOD5-gAsh4MZNNTfvrETEFwpudB0ybTJ26LRj0iLz702piLhQIXAT-M65l5yL0BGQMyBEnScAoKogAIXRCgq6hWYgFCsUENhGM0K4LoSmZhftpbQkhDCpxQw93EbvUt0ucP_q8fur9026wM_5Xq_WruxxF3D0i6Fxfd21Cbu2wmUX47Ae3zifUMcV9m0fNwdoJ7gm-cPPuo9ebq6fr-6Kx6fb-6vLx6KUnPVFCKJkXEoDFYP5XFAXBDBKKhOqyoEOJnA3Lysh514FCRpkMMaxSvNQeuXZPjqdfNexext86u2qTqVvGtf6bkgWONdKUQbqP6ikilBt_oEyLUSem_-NMsGoJprRjJ78QJfdENv8PSMljTKM6UzBRJWxSyn6YNexXrm4sUDsmK-d8rU5Xzvma0dnOmlSZtuFj9-cfxEdT6Jl6rv41YXTvA-QB_4An46vwg</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1356979338</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Greasing the wheels? The impact of regulations and corruption on firm entry</title><source>Jstor Complete Legacy</source><source>Political Science Complete</source><source>PAIS Index</source><source>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</source><source>SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings</source><source>EBSCOhost Business Source Complete</source><creator>Dreher, Axel ; Gassebner, Martin</creator><creatorcontrib>Dreher, Axel ; Gassebner, Martin</creatorcontrib><description>This paper investigates the question of whether corruption might 'grease the wheels' of an economy. We investigate whether and to what extent the impact of regulations on entrepreneurship is dependent on corruption. We first test whether regulations robustly deter firm entry into markets. Our results show that the existence of a larger number of procedures required to start a business, as well as larger minimum capital requirements are detrimental to entrepreneurship. Second, we test whether corruption reduces the negative impact of regulations on entrepreneurship in highly regulated economies. Our empirical analysis, covering a maximum of 43 countries over the 2003-2005 period, shows that corruption facilitates firm entry in highly regulated economies. For example, the 'greasing' effect of corruption kicks in at around 50 days required to start a new business. Our results thus provide support for the 'grease the wheels' hypothesis.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0048-5829</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1573-7101</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9871-2</identifier><identifier>CODEN: PUCHBX</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Boston: Springer</publisher><subject>Bureaucracy ; Bureaucrats ; Business ; Business corruption ; Business ethics ; Capital ; Capital requirements ; Corruption ; Economic freedom ; Economic growth ; Economic regulation ; Economics ; Economics and Finance ; Empirical research ; Entrepreneurs ; Entrepreneurship ; Government corruption ; Grease ; Gross domestic product ; Hypotheses ; Market ; Market entry ; Markets ; Minimum wages ; Political corruption ; Political Science ; Public choice ; Public Finance ; Regulation ; World Bank</subject><ispartof>Public choice, 2013-06, Vol.155 (3/4), p.413-432</ispartof><rights>2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht</rights><rights>The Author(s) 2011</rights><rights>Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c643t-ff5c346691d31bb52af51320d9fdda18f9f4abcd56be7f61816f99a3d84fce7e3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c643t-ff5c346691d31bb52af51320d9fdda18f9f4abcd56be7f61816f99a3d84fce7e3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/42003108$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/42003108$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,799,12824,27842,27901,27902,41464,42533,51294,57992,58225</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Dreher, Axel</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Gassebner, Martin</creatorcontrib><title>Greasing the wheels? The impact of regulations and corruption on firm entry</title><title>Public choice</title><addtitle>Public Choice</addtitle><description>This paper investigates the question of whether corruption might 'grease the wheels' of an economy. We investigate whether and to what extent the impact of regulations on entrepreneurship is dependent on corruption. We first test whether regulations robustly deter firm entry into markets. Our results show that the existence of a larger number of procedures required to start a business, as well as larger minimum capital requirements are detrimental to entrepreneurship. Second, we test whether corruption reduces the negative impact of regulations on entrepreneurship in highly regulated economies. Our empirical analysis, covering a maximum of 43 countries over the 2003-2005 period, shows that corruption facilitates firm entry in highly regulated economies. For example, the 'greasing' effect of corruption kicks in at around 50 days required to start a new business. Our results thus provide support for the 'grease the wheels' hypothesis.</description><subject>Bureaucracy</subject><subject>Bureaucrats</subject><subject>Business</subject><subject>Business corruption</subject><subject>Business ethics</subject><subject>Capital</subject><subject>Capital requirements</subject><subject>Corruption</subject><subject>Economic freedom</subject><subject>Economic growth</subject><subject>Economic regulation</subject><subject>Economics</subject><subject>Economics and Finance</subject><subject>Empirical research</subject><subject>Entrepreneurs</subject><subject>Entrepreneurship</subject><subject>Government corruption</subject><subject>Grease</subject><subject>Gross domestic product</subject><subject>Hypotheses</subject><subject>Market</subject><subject>Market entry</subject><subject>Markets</subject><subject>Minimum wages</subject><subject>Political corruption</subject><subject>Political Science</subject><subject>Public choice</subject><subject>Public Finance</subject><subject>Regulation</subject><subject>World Bank</subject><issn>0048-5829</issn><issn>1573-7101</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2013</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>C6C</sourceid><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><recordid>eNqNkktLxDAUhYMoOD5-gAsh4MZNNTfvrETEFwpudB0ybTJ26LRj0iLz702piLhQIXAT-M65l5yL0BGQMyBEnScAoKogAIXRCgq6hWYgFCsUENhGM0K4LoSmZhftpbQkhDCpxQw93EbvUt0ucP_q8fur9026wM_5Xq_WruxxF3D0i6Fxfd21Cbu2wmUX47Ae3zifUMcV9m0fNwdoJ7gm-cPPuo9ebq6fr-6Kx6fb-6vLx6KUnPVFCKJkXEoDFYP5XFAXBDBKKhOqyoEOJnA3Lysh514FCRpkMMaxSvNQeuXZPjqdfNexext86u2qTqVvGtf6bkgWONdKUQbqP6ikilBt_oEyLUSem_-NMsGoJprRjJ78QJfdENv8PSMljTKM6UzBRJWxSyn6YNexXrm4sUDsmK-d8rU5Xzvma0dnOmlSZtuFj9-cfxEdT6Jl6rv41YXTvA-QB_4An46vwg</recordid><startdate>20130601</startdate><enddate>20130601</enddate><creator>Dreher, Axel</creator><creator>Gassebner, Martin</creator><general>Springer</general><general>Springer US</general><general>Springer Nature B.V</general><scope>C6C</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>0-V</scope><scope>0U~</scope><scope>1-H</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7UB</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>88C</scope><scope>88J</scope><scope>8AO</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8FI</scope><scope>8FJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AEUYN</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ALSLI</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DPSOV</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>FYUFA</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>GHDGH</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>HEHIP</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>K8~</scope><scope>KC-</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>L.0</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>M0T</scope><scope>M2L</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>M2R</scope><scope>M2S</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>Q9U</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20130601</creationdate><title>Greasing the wheels? The impact of regulations and corruption on firm entry</title><author>Dreher, Axel ; Gassebner, Martin</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c643t-ff5c346691d31bb52af51320d9fdda18f9f4abcd56be7f61816f99a3d84fce7e3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2013</creationdate><topic>Bureaucracy</topic><topic>Bureaucrats</topic><topic>Business</topic><topic>Business corruption</topic><topic>Business ethics</topic><topic>Capital</topic><topic>Capital requirements</topic><topic>Corruption</topic><topic>Economic freedom</topic><topic>Economic growth</topic><topic>Economic regulation</topic><topic>Economics</topic><topic>Economics and Finance</topic><topic>Empirical research</topic><topic>Entrepreneurs</topic><topic>Entrepreneurship</topic><topic>Government corruption</topic><topic>Grease</topic><topic>Gross domestic product</topic><topic>Hypotheses</topic><topic>Market</topic><topic>Market entry</topic><topic>Markets</topic><topic>Minimum wages</topic><topic>Political corruption</topic><topic>Political Science</topic><topic>Public choice</topic><topic>Public Finance</topic><topic>Regulation</topic><topic>World Bank</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Dreher, Axel</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Gassebner, Martin</creatorcontrib><collection>Springer Nature OA Free Journals</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>ProQuest Social Sciences Premium Collection</collection><collection>Global News & ABI/Inform Professional</collection><collection>Trade PRO</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (PDF only)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Healthcare Administration Database (Alumni)</collection><collection>Social Science Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Pharma Collection</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Research Library (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Sustainability</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>Social Science Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>Politics Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>Research Library Prep</collection><collection>Sociology Collection</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection</collection><collection>DELNET Management Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Politics Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Standard</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global</collection><collection>Healthcare Administration Database</collection><collection>Political Science Database</collection><collection>Research Library</collection><collection>Social Science Database</collection><collection>Sociology Database</collection><collection>Research Library (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><jtitle>Public choice</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Dreher, Axel</au><au>Gassebner, Martin</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Greasing the wheels? The impact of regulations and corruption on firm entry</atitle><jtitle>Public choice</jtitle><stitle>Public Choice</stitle><date>2013-06-01</date><risdate>2013</risdate><volume>155</volume><issue>3/4</issue><spage>413</spage><epage>432</epage><pages>413-432</pages><issn>0048-5829</issn><eissn>1573-7101</eissn><coden>PUCHBX</coden><abstract>This paper investigates the question of whether corruption might 'grease the wheels' of an economy. We investigate whether and to what extent the impact of regulations on entrepreneurship is dependent on corruption. We first test whether regulations robustly deter firm entry into markets. Our results show that the existence of a larger number of procedures required to start a business, as well as larger minimum capital requirements are detrimental to entrepreneurship. Second, we test whether corruption reduces the negative impact of regulations on entrepreneurship in highly regulated economies. Our empirical analysis, covering a maximum of 43 countries over the 2003-2005 period, shows that corruption facilitates firm entry in highly regulated economies. For example, the 'greasing' effect of corruption kicks in at around 50 days required to start a new business. Our results thus provide support for the 'grease the wheels' hypothesis.</abstract><cop>Boston</cop><pub>Springer</pub><doi>10.1007/s11127-011-9871-2</doi><tpages>20</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0048-5829 |
| ispartof | Public choice, 2013-06, Vol.155 (3/4), p.413-432 |
| issn | 0048-5829 1573-7101 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1448772317 |
| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; Political Science Complete; PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Bureaucracy Bureaucrats Business Business corruption Business ethics Capital Capital requirements Corruption Economic freedom Economic growth Economic regulation Economics Economics and Finance Empirical research Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurship Government corruption Grease Gross domestic product Hypotheses Market Market entry Markets Minimum wages Political corruption Political Science Public choice Public Finance Regulation World Bank |
| title | Greasing the wheels? The impact of regulations and corruption on firm entry |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-02-05T16%3A00%3A05IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Greasing%20the%20wheels?%20The%20impact%20of%20regulations%20and%20corruption%20on%20firm%20entry&rft.jtitle=Public%20choice&rft.au=Dreher,%20Axel&rft.date=2013-06-01&rft.volume=155&rft.issue=3/4&rft.spage=413&rft.epage=432&rft.pages=413-432&rft.issn=0048-5829&rft.eissn=1573-7101&rft.coden=PUCHBX&rft_id=info:doi/10.1007/s11127-011-9871-2&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E42003108%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1356979338&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=42003108&rfr_iscdi=true |