Customer equilibrium and optimal strategies in Markovian queues in series
We consider series of M / M / m queues with strategic customer behavior. Customers arrive to the first queue and decide whether to enter the system or balk and, if they enter, up to which queue to proceed before departing. Each customer makes an independent decision, with the objective of maximizing...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Annals of operations research 2013-09, Vol.208 (1), p.515-529 |
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| container_title | Annals of operations research |
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| creator | Burnetas, Apostolos N. |
| description | We consider series of
M
/
M
/
m
queues with strategic customer behavior. Customers arrive to the first queue and decide whether to enter the system or balk and, if they enter, up to which queue to proceed before departing. Each customer makes an independent decision, with the objective of maximizing her total net benefit, which is equal to the value of service minus a cost due to expected delay. We formulate the customer decision as a game and identify the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy, which is expressed in a backward recursive form. We also analyze the problem of maximizing the total customer welfare and establish the relationship between the equilibrium and the welfare maximizing strategies. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s10479-011-1010-4 |
| format | Article |
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M
/
M
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queues with strategic customer behavior. Customers arrive to the first queue and decide whether to enter the system or balk and, if they enter, up to which queue to proceed before departing. Each customer makes an independent decision, with the objective of maximizing her total net benefit, which is equal to the value of service minus a cost due to expected delay. We formulate the customer decision as a game and identify the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy, which is expressed in a backward recursive form. We also analyze the problem of maximizing the total customer welfare and establish the relationship between the equilibrium and the welfare maximizing strategies.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0254-5330</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1572-9338</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1007/s10479-011-1010-4</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Boston: Springer US</publisher><subject>Business and Management ; Combinatorics ; Communications networks ; Customer relationship management ; Customer services ; Delay ; Dynamic programming ; Equilibrium ; Game theory ; Games ; Markov processes ; Operations research ; Operations Research/Decision Theory ; Optimization ; Query processing ; Queues ; Queuing ; Recursive ; Strategy ; Studies ; Theory of Computation</subject><ispartof>Annals of operations research, 2013-09, Vol.208 (1), p.515-529</ispartof><rights>Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011</rights><rights>COPYRIGHT 2013 Springer</rights><rights>Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c453t-84e8d4d2452f09efb703c11d4246bafce9e221e5fdf688f47ab4a7be2cf4fabf3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c453t-84e8d4d2452f09efb703c11d4246bafce9e221e5fdf688f47ab4a7be2cf4fabf3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10479-011-1010-4$$EPDF$$P50$$Gspringer$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10479-011-1010-4$$EHTML$$P50$$Gspringer$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,777,781,27905,27906,41469,42538,51300</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Burnetas, Apostolos N.</creatorcontrib><title>Customer equilibrium and optimal strategies in Markovian queues in series</title><title>Annals of operations research</title><addtitle>Ann Oper Res</addtitle><description>We consider series of
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queues with strategic customer behavior. Customers arrive to the first queue and decide whether to enter the system or balk and, if they enter, up to which queue to proceed before departing. Each customer makes an independent decision, with the objective of maximizing her total net benefit, which is equal to the value of service minus a cost due to expected delay. We formulate the customer decision as a game and identify the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy, which is expressed in a backward recursive form. We also analyze the problem of maximizing the total customer welfare and establish the relationship between the equilibrium and the welfare maximizing strategies.</description><subject>Business and Management</subject><subject>Combinatorics</subject><subject>Communications networks</subject><subject>Customer relationship management</subject><subject>Customer services</subject><subject>Delay</subject><subject>Dynamic programming</subject><subject>Equilibrium</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Games</subject><subject>Markov processes</subject><subject>Operations research</subject><subject>Operations Research/Decision Theory</subject><subject>Optimization</subject><subject>Query processing</subject><subject>Queues</subject><subject>Queuing</subject><subject>Recursive</subject><subject>Strategy</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Theory of 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equilibrium and optimal strategies in Markovian queues in series</title><author>Burnetas, Apostolos N.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c453t-84e8d4d2452f09efb703c11d4246bafce9e221e5fdf688f47ab4a7be2cf4fabf3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2013</creationdate><topic>Business and Management</topic><topic>Combinatorics</topic><topic>Communications networks</topic><topic>Customer relationship management</topic><topic>Customer services</topic><topic>Delay</topic><topic>Dynamic programming</topic><topic>Equilibrium</topic><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>Games</topic><topic>Markov processes</topic><topic>Operations research</topic><topic>Operations Research/Decision Theory</topic><topic>Optimization</topic><topic>Query processing</topic><topic>Queues</topic><topic>Queuing</topic><topic>Recursive</topic><topic>Strategy</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Theory of 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M
/
M
/
m
queues with strategic customer behavior. Customers arrive to the first queue and decide whether to enter the system or balk and, if they enter, up to which queue to proceed before departing. Each customer makes an independent decision, with the objective of maximizing her total net benefit, which is equal to the value of service minus a cost due to expected delay. We formulate the customer decision as a game and identify the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy, which is expressed in a backward recursive form. We also analyze the problem of maximizing the total customer welfare and establish the relationship between the equilibrium and the welfare maximizing strategies.</abstract><cop>Boston</cop><pub>Springer US</pub><doi>10.1007/s10479-011-1010-4</doi><tpages>15</tpages></addata></record> |
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| ispartof | Annals of operations research, 2013-09, Vol.208 (1), p.515-529 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Business Source Complete; Springer Nature - Complete Springer Journals |
| subjects | Business and Management Combinatorics Communications networks Customer relationship management Customer services Delay Dynamic programming Equilibrium Game theory Games Markov processes Operations research Operations Research/Decision Theory Optimization Query processing Queues Queuing Recursive Strategy Studies Theory of Computation |
| title | Customer equilibrium and optimal strategies in Markovian queues in series |
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