When does ownership matter? Board characteristics and behavior

We develop a contingency approach to explain how firm ownership influences the monitoring function of the board—measured as the magnitude of external audit fees contracted by the board—by extending agency theory to incorporate the resource dependence notion that boards have distinct incentives and a...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Strategic management journal 2013-07, Vol.34 (7), p.823-842
Hauptverfasser:	DESENDER, KURT A., AGUILERA, RUTH V., CRESPI, RAFEL, GARCÍA-CESTONA, MIGUEL
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Agency theory audit Audit fees Auditing board of directors Boards of directors Business audits Business management Business ownership Business structures Chief executive officers Corporate governance Economic incentives Europe Fees Financial audits Management audits Management theory Monitoring Ownership ownership structure Shareholders Stockholders Strategic management Studies
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